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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thie study daale with the first phaea of the poet-1118r lend reform in 
Tei.,.n, the 37.5 par cent farm rent lim1tet1on program of 1949. Thil 
phase 1• analyzed in tat111e of coneaQuencas on agricultural productivity 
end income distribution. Contribution• ee wall es limitetione of the 
reform ere conaldarad. rinelly, further atap• era euggeatad. 
A. Need for L•nd Reform in Tei•an 
l. Historical background 
The recent hietory of Teiwen 1• ea peculiar end unique that certain 
background recta are needed ta facilitate the understanding of the main 
theme or this •tudy . 
Since the Japane•• took over Taiwan from China in 1095, Tei•an hes 
underoane vest change• oolitically, eocielly, end economically. 
Before 1895, Taiwan had been e territory or China for two hundred 
yeara but hed never been integrated into Chine . Tei.en wee remote from 
the Chin••• political canter. It wee mounteinoua with reeulting com-
munication• difficulties end plagued with dieeesa• and epidemics. 
Throughout these two centuriae Tailll8n'• economy remained etegnent. Its 
eociel end political frema111Drk wee feudali1tic end unetebla. 
But the aituetion changed ln 1895 with the coming or its new ruler, 
Jepan. riret, Taiwan baceina e colony of Japan. In order to increase 
productivity in her nttwly acquired colony to feed the mother country, 
Japan 1111111adietaly recognized the need for aociel refoTms and economic 
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growth. Creduelly, stability end security were brought into tha island 
to form the beaie for e modern cepitel1et1o society. Meen\llhll• advanced 
technology wee introduced to increeee production, eepeclelly agricultural 
production and releted praceeeing ectivitiee. Outing thi• period , Teiw~n 
witneeead e revolutionary chenga. Maohenization , technology, end science 
were introduced. Organized net~orks of e•tanaion end edminlatretion 
further contributed to the lnersasad production and higher level of living . 
Thua. with the advent of Jepaneee rule there wee substantial aver- ell 
progress in the economic ea well ea the eociel life of Taiwan. Ho~vvar, 
in the midst of this general orogrees end even in the midst of ramerkable 
growth in agricultural production. egrerien structurae in rural Telwan had 
been left largely untouched. They remeined lergoly feudalistic in Taiwan 
es wae elao the cese in Jepen. It le understandable that egrer1en prob-
lem•, apeclficelly lend tenure problame, baceme increeaingly aerioua in 
T~iwan (end in Jepen proper) beginning in the yeere betmean 1910 end 1920. 
Occurrence of tenancy disputes in Taiwan increased from e yaerly average 
of 45 for the two decedee anding in 1929, to 609 ceaes annually in the 
l9~0 ' a. r~equency or these conflict• reached a peek of 1,502 ca•e• in 
1940 (1, p. 33). 
The probletns becDma ao acute that offioiele became concerned about 
the outcoine of resulting aocial unrest in th• rural communities end their 
adveree affects on agricultural production. However, before the Jepenase 
could llllDrk out effective meesuree to cope with the aituntion. World i.ar II 
broke out, end th• problems ware carried over to the post- war period. 
In 1945, with the end or the wer, Te1wen wee restored to Chine . The 
Chin••• government 1111t• faced et once with the tesk or rehebilit•tion end 
raconatruotion in the 1i1111ke or the ~~r . rood• were deaparetely scarce. 
Inflationary praaaura• ••r• atrong . Agricultural production hed to be 
increased rapidly . At the eeme time , the revolution within ~•inland 
Chine forced the Netion•liat government to retire to Tailll8n. In her 
endeavor to improve such e peaaimietic political climate end to recepture, 
once egein, people's confidence end aupport, the N•tionaliat government 
wee firmly determined to et teck Tei~•n 'a aocio-aconomic ~••knas• in lend 
tenure structures ae a meena to aarve economic needs and to ameliorate 
the political crisis . 
rrom thi• background, lend reform came to Taiwan in 19•9 . The feet 
thet this ia a fifteen yeer old refer~ ahould not mislead ua to think 
that it ie a "peat" program. It ia atill ectiva and influential. Since 
it• inception in 1949. lend reform h•• alweye been the o.,trel pillar or 
Teiweneee agricultural policy. !lloreover, it has provided the beaia for 
the over-all "development policy" (Tinbergan, 2, p. 4) comprising e eerie• 
of four-yeer economic development plane, the firat of which wea intro-
duced in 1953. 
2. Agrarian •ituetione relevant to the tenancy problem• 
Poat - war needs for lond reform in T•i~•n aare multireceted. The 
specific agrerien aituetione relevant to the tenancy eyatem are preaanted 
here in connection *1th the otiv•tion1 thet ouahed the reror~ into the 
foreground. 
rtret, in the economic field, there wee e deaperete food ehortage 
4 
end reeultant inflet1on immediately after the ~er. .oreover, when the 
Chineee government retired to T iwen in 1047, meny civil1ene end ••rvica-
~•n migrated to Tei.an from the ~•inland. Not only waa more food needed 
for conaumption, extra food •tock• ware required for the continuing etrug-
gle againet mainland Chine. In addition. the population 1198 growing by 
J.O par cant annually (3, p. 14). An increeae in food 1upply we• urgently 
needed. Ho~ever, agrarian etructurea, end more epecifically, the prevail-
ing tenancy ayetem wee not ravoreble to generetino the needed incr•••• in 
food production. 
Table 1. Tenure or form operator• in Taiwon prior to the refor~ a 
(HouHholda) 
Owner-re.rmere Pert-owner a Tenant• Total 
(Thou- (Thou- (Thou- (Thou-
Veer eende) («" ) eande) ( ) eenda) (1) Hnde) (~) 
1931-1940 Average 131.4 31.3 129.5 30.9 158.6 37.B 419. 5 100 
1945 149.4 29.9 147 . • 29.4 203.7 40.7 soo.s 100 
1947 174.9 31.6 152.7 27.6 225.7 40.8 553.3 100 
1949 22•. 4 36.1 166.6 25.2 239.9 38.7 620.9 100 
• Sourc•• (~ , PP• 8-9). 
According to T•bla l about t111a-thirda or the rer••r• rented all or 
pert or the lend they cultivat•d. And according to J. Loeeing Buck 
(5, PP• 80-Bl), they ranted 45 per cent of the cultivated land. het 
•ere the reason• that accounted for auch e high concentration of 
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own•r•hip reflected by widaapread tenancy? 
Scarcity of lend resol.4"oe• with increasing population growth wea 
one r•e•on. Of a total eree of ebout 3,596,000 heeteraa, only 24 per cent 
or 865,000 hectere• w•r• under cultivation (4, p. 11) . On the other hand, 
there ware 7.4 million people crollded on this tiny island. Among them 
about 52 par cant or 3.9 ~illion were angeged in agriculture in 1949 
(4, p. 7). Population preaaura haa elaeys bean very heavy. An annual 
growth rate of J.O per cent or more waa not unuauelJ in ao~a year• the 
rate went up to 3.5 per cent or higher. Thus, Te iiuen wee hllllvily hendi-
C1lppad by the unfavoreble men-lend ratio, which ahowe no aign of improve· 
ment in the near future. 
To thia should be edded th• lack of divar•ification in Taiwan'• 
economy. Like other underdavelop•d countries, Tei•e n'a economy hes been 
predominantly egriculturel. The importance of agriculture in term• of 
the number or people engaged in it he• been mentioned. Velue-wiae il ia 
elao the number one industry. Agriculture, in feet, accounted for 47 
per cent of the total incOllle or Teiwen in the decade just before world 
\lier II (6, pp. 26-27). Thie impli•• thet those people who heve been re-
l•••ed 'rem the egricultural occupetion during it• technological develop-
ment end mechanization ea ~ell •• thoae lllho heve newly joined the lebor 
force ea the reeult or the population incr•••e, llDuld heve hed greeter 
difficulty in finding job• either within or outside of egricultura. lt 
1• inevitable thet unemployment or underemployment, fretJUently dleguiaad, 
pr•valled in rural Taiwan. 
These forcea ndded together put the farmers in e vulnereble group 
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lllhil• the landlords, the "high society", enjoyed superior economic end 
•ooial conditions. rer~er1 t-ed little or no bargaining po~er when deal-
ing •1th landlord• . Thay had to accept whatever t:ea ofrerad by the 
letter, or they would loaa their maeger meena of eubaistance. And, 
there were always many fallow farmer• who ware anxious to take over the 
land from them under ~hetavar term• the landlords d11111ended . Thu•, it ie 
not aurpriaing to find the tenant group in hopeless poverty and insecur ity . 
They lived et the mercy of their lendlorda. Under such conditiona, it i• 
aleo no aurpri•• that they did not have the incentive to work end produce 
more. This structural defect hed to be rat::10vad if en i ncra••• in produc-
tion a• well as improved inco a distribution W81"a to be achieved . 
The social recat of the need for the rafor• ia related to the eco-
nomic one. Prior to tho reform , as every~here in denaaly populated egri-
culturel countriea, lend in Tniwen wee e 1ymbol of both •eelth end aociel 
statue. H19h aociel value , in addition to the economic value determined 
by the cepitelization or future returne, came to be attached to -lend. 
Thi• trend led to the formation of two sharply contraeted cleeeee, the 
!ended •rietocrecy and the lendleaa peaaentry. further, it wee practically 
impoaalble for the letter to climb up the social leddar into th• former 
cleea. rermere baceme deaperete, hopeless . end lost aepiration. They 
had little interest in perti cipeting in sociel activities. This kind of 
COllll'l.tUnity ••• certainly inconeiatent with e democracy ~here one ie re-
epected for hi• contribution to society and 111'\are lebor ia dignified. 
Nor 11ae it hermoniouai leek of cooperative spirit, even antagonia end 
unr88t underlined such e eooiaty. Nor we• it prograsaiv•• the eea of 
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the farm ra hed no roots in the co munity in which they lived . Thus, 
lendlordi•m'• implication for community life ~• eQually vital. I t wee 
on obetecle to democrotic end progreaaivs development. 
The final. and perhepa the most important reeson from the Netioneliet 
govornment ' e point or vi ew, weo the political one. In the l e tter helf or 
the 1940's , defeated end driven out of '-•inlend Chine by communiata, the 
government wea severely dapreeaad by the political criais. The government 
had to , first of ell, secur e full aupport from tho people living in Teiuien. 
Land reform waa one euch potential measure. It is recalled that in Teiwan 
r~rmere comprised more then one-hGlf or the population, and the majority 
or them suffered from abuaas practiced by landlord•. The new government 
etrove to obtain the aupport of the maea of fermera by improving their 
economic end social atetue. Landlords could not poaaibly opoo•• the reform 
either . baceuee they ~ould have loet not only their land but also thol r 
livae hed the comniunieta cont:;uered Teiwan. 
8 . T•o Phaeaa of the Poet- wer Lend Refor m in Taiaen 
Tenancy i~provamant came to constitute e prerequisite for the pro9re•• 
and peace of Taiwan. Actually, lend tenure problems end land reform have 
been th• major concern of the netionel leedera since the birth or the 
nation . Or . Sun. Yet-aen, the founder of the nation, advocated the •1end-
to-the-tiller11 pro9rem, i.e . , th• creation of ou.nar-fermare, •• the goal 
or the lend tenure policy in rree China . Presi dent Chi ang, Kai -ehak hea 
often pointed out that the land problem is the root of e ll probleme, end 
tha t only through l end r e rorm c•n ell other problems be eolved . or cour••· 
s 
there era many ~eye to eoproech the lend probl m. In Taiwen, tho lend 
problem end r•form sere epproached peacefully end progreeslvely in ttJO 
phases. 
The r1ret phase, the 37.5 par cent fe rm rent li~!tet!on progrmi of 
1949, wes implemented in Teiwen ee the preliminary step ulti~etely to 
leed to the ~lend-to-the-tiller" progr em. This preliminary progrem was 
concerned with elimination or the ebueee or tenancy en privately c~n•d 
cultiveted lend. In thie program the •mpheeie wee not on the change of 
lend tenure •yetan it.elf. Rether it tried to protect end improve tenant•' 
e0:0nomic end social p~eitiona within the framework of the term tenancy 
ayatam. 
rour yeere later , in 1953, the government felt the ti~• wee r i pe 
for them to proln\Jlgata the "lend-to-the-tillel'" Act• end launch ihe f'inal 
pheaa of the lend refol'fTI. It ia thi• finel phase of the reform thet 
attacked the tenancy ay•tam directly . It triad to chenge the ov•r-ell 
t•nure structures into the owner-farmer system by compulaory purchaeea or 
tenented lend from the landlord• by the tenant•. 
C. Scope and Objectives of the Study 
foregoing etetementa reveal thet (e) the land problem end consequent 
reform hed very bro~d implication• ancompeeeing polit.icel end social es 
~all ea economic eoneideretions end (b) the recent land reform in T•i~en 
waa actually composed of t~o eapereta programe. It eppeers then that a 
complete enelyaia require• a comprehe"•iva aoproech that takes economic. 
social , political, end cultural aspect• of both proQrems into coneidarction. 
9 
In thi• •tudy, how•v•r, the •ffort 1• limited largely to the econoMic 
eapeote or implicetione of the firat phaae or the reform. Thi• 1• en 
acono~io enelyeia or the 37 . 5 per cent farm rent limitetion progrem of 
1949 in Taiwan. 
Objectiv•• of thia atudy ere four-folds 
(a) To e~plore d•fecta in farm tenancy •rrengement• prior to th• 
rator~ , including naada for the r•form end di•••tiefectlone with th• 
tenancy ayat.n . Juat llhet eepech of the tenancy ayahsn nr• d•8111•d to 
be und••irebl• ea e precondition to tha reform? Th• firat obj•ctive 
eeeks to •newer thia queation. 
(b) To clarify, obj•ctively. the goela of the progrem . Actually 
the above mentioned diagnosis of the existing situation calla for th• 
identification of goela. Articulation of the goele of the program i• 
not en eaey teak, es the ~aana-and• echema auggeata . much confusion 
hes resulted from the failur• to clarify goals . This study tri•• to 
identify not only the ultimate goela but elao the tergeta, the enda- in-
view, or the program. 
(c) To evaluate the effectiveneas of the progrem in terms of the 
goele end tergete declared by the government. On whet eapecta and to 
whet degr•e hee the progrem been 81.lcceesful or unsucceaeful? 
(d) To auggast further ectione. Every program will pre•um•bly 
heve eome failure ale~enta within its own cante~t. rurth•r, every pro-
gre~ 11111 probably have eoma effect• on non-teroet variable• (7, p. 24) 
ea aide effect• of change• on other facet• or the economy. How may 
th .. a fellure ele•enta of the program be ••elioreted? Ho• may adv.re• 
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•ida affects be eliminated? Anawer• to these quaetiona should indicate 
further eotiona. Moreover, i" e dynemic economyt constent changes or 
maditicetione of the program era neoeasery to k .. p pace with changing 
condition•. 
In ahart, this study will look at the progr&OI ee a part of the 
over-ell economic development policy end recommend further remedial maea-
ure• from the over-all policy point of viaw. 1 
o. Analyticel rremawork of tha Study 
l. Some basic conaideretiona 
Purauit of improv911ent or development. whether that of the individ• 
ual'a position or thet of the whole society , ia ea old es human history. 
~het ie not ao old la the development policy in t.he aanea of planned, 
conelatent and ayat8111etic action. Thia ie aapecielly true in the caae 
of undardevaloped countriae. It •ea only efter the end of world war II 
thet the governments of these countrlea becSl!e more eoutely B\IBte of the 
need for end poaalbilitiee of aconomic development. Used in thia context 
econo•ic development means increeaea in per cepite productivity ee maaa-
ured by ennuel per capita income. 
Economic dev•lopment cannot take pleca unleea certein basic cond1-
t1one are fulfilled. It also h•• to be approached in accordance with 
each notion'• pertJ.culer conditions . 
rirat , it is essential that the government craetae genarel condi-
tion• favorable ta development. Among tha four such requirement• proposed 
by Tinbergen (2, pp. 4-5), one, "to provide• minimum of eocial security 
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and to correct the IAO&t extreme 1neQu•lit1•• in income--inequality ee•ily 
conducive to social unre•t end leek or cooperative spirit in production", 
eppeere applicable in pre-reform Taiwen. Extreme inequality in income 
dietribution between landlorde and tenants together lllith its economic . 
eociel, and political implications Nie already bean pointed out. 
Second, •1th more than one-half of the population engaged in agri-
culture, the over-all development or T•i~~n will be conditioned much by 
the pace of development taking plec• in the agricultural sector. In 
Taiwan, the institutional frame110rk of tenancy wee •uch that it formed 
a eeriou• obatecle to the economic prograae end sociel stability. Thu• 
attention wae focueed on, and initial priority wee given to th• tenancy 
improvU1ent in poet-war Taiwan. 
A relevant question in the enaly•i• and improvement of tenancy 
condition• iea what function• will the tenancy improvamante be expected 
to perform? Two eaeentiel economic functions of tenency improvement• 
are given by Or. TilllROt\a •• follow• (8, pp. 7-S)a 
(a) Tenancy improvements ehould provide an in•titutional freme1110rk 
sithin llllich individual• can work to better their own poaition end thet 
or their society. To help lH• fortunate individuals ao thet nai ther 
party can take advantage of the other *hile at the aeme time retaining 
the incentive of individual betterment es a reeult of herd llOtk and 
akillful management, era requisite• of t•nency improvement. 
(b) Tenancy etructur•• ahould furnish the beats for the economic 
allocation of resources end for the equitable distribution of the return• 
in accordance with the productivitie• or contributed resources. 
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Within thie construct, tenency improv9111ent ie needed •henever eecu-
rity, social juatice, efficiency ln production, and equality in inco~• 
distributi on •re at stake. 
2 . Analytical model end procedure of this study 
The analytical o al of a progrwn or measure contains three elamente, 
ell of them closely releteda (e) the go•l• hich guide 1 prove ent, 
(b) the •e•na which link goals nd the coneeauencea , end (c) the conea-
cuencee both expected end realized . Thie concept 1118Y be axprasaad in en 
equation-like for (7, p. 2l)i 
GOALS~ ~EANS :::; CONSECU( NCES 
(Economic gr_o_w~t~h-,~~~-(~P~o~l~i~c~i-e-,-,~p-r-o--~~~-- (Realized, 
aocial development, greme, atructurea, expected) 
and political ete- end instruments) 
bility) 
Coale in the above equation ere fixed end gi v n ea deternllnad by 
the people. They represent the ideal eituetion people atrive to achieve . 
~eena ie e veriebla. Uauelly there ere ny elternetlves open to the 
people . [ach meena, however, leeda to apecific conaequencea llhlch may 
or ••y not fit the given goele. Therefore, effectivanaaa of the part!-
cul•r aeene muat b evaluated in light of the goels. Generally, conaa-
quencea expected are the goele thameelvea. Consequence• raelized, ho•-
ever, ere nothar matter. The wider the difference between the•• tM>, 
the leaa affective the means ere. 
The intarrelationahipe bet•een goale, maena, end conaequencea ~uet 
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be formuleted in tha contS)(t of th• present etudy. ror this purpoa• ~• 
shell firat (e) identify th• goale end torgate of the progrem end (b) 
examine existing tenancy eituetiona. The goal• will actuelly bacom• 
•terget varieblee" (7. p. 23) Mlh•naver people eeeign e certain level or 
eccompliahmant (like e 5 par cent increase in agriculture! productivity 
par yaer) to the goele. In any ceee, from tha economist'• point of view, 
goela (including target•) are fixed end the problem or identifying th91R 
ariaee. The divergence between existing situations end the goela con-
sists of e problematic area or intervening gap (7 , p. 22) . It is this 
gap that the remedial means i• expected to fill. The•• three topica, 
goela end tergeta, problematic ereea, end maene will be treatad in 
Chepter• II, III. end IV, resoectively. 
Analyaia of conaaquencea expected end reelizad by the progrem, i . e . , 
evaluation or the program, ie given in Chapter V and is done in terms of 
oo• l e end targets identified . In thia chapter, the diagnosis ie made to 
diacover the eucceaa elements of the progre~--the extent to which goela 
are ectuolly re•lized . Than, the failure elements of the program are 
exeMined- -the extent to ~hich goela •r• expected but not realized by 
thia particular program. Since mean• era verieblee it ia poaaible ta 
develop or diacovar alternative or complementary meana to alimineta th••• 
feilur a element• . Theaa will be considered alao. Third, the program i• 
but a part of the integral policy . Although it limit• ite eeopa to ferm 
tenancy etructurel chenge only, it certainly will exercise aoma aide 
effects on other facets both w1thin end outaide or egricult.ure . Thea• 
eida effaote are called "non-target varieblea" (7 , p. 23) . These 
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intar-aactionel reletionahipe and •ffecte ~ill be analyzed and, in the 
coee of adverse aide effects, remedial etape will be suggsat•d• finally, 
in the rcca or the dynamic economy, constant modificotione or th• pro-
grem are naoeasery in ord•r to meintein end expand the auccase elamants. 
Thla9• longer term aff ecta will eleo be coneidered. 
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II. PROOL(l!1ATIC AREAS 
The land reform of modern rre• Chine wea born out of th• observation 
thet the tenonts' level of living had been preaaed to th• bar• eubsiet-
ence level (9 , p. 187). Thi• brings ua to the queetioni whet were nth• 
evil• of the treditionel system of l end tenure ~hich hindered eQricul-
tural production end forced down the far~•ra' standard of living" 
(10, p. 9)7 
Since the lendlord and tenant ehar• the product of farminy, their 
inter•sts may be in oonflict. Under the conditions of rapid population 
gro•th and relatively scarce reaourc••• the trend *as for the landlord• 
to poasaee increasingly atronger bei-gaining power. Ae e result tenants 
had to bear heavy rentel charges, yet. their t•nure rights were never 
secure. 
A. Problematic Areas Raaponaible for Poverty of Tenante 
Excessive rental charges were the core or the problem here . At 
th!• point tha concept of fair rent may be raised to serve as the point 
of departure, i.e., rents larger then that qualified by fair rent era 
declared to be unfair or too high. Theoretically , feir rent may be 
determined by the merginel productivity of the land reaourcae. The 
dre11beck of th le approach ia that it ie not practical. Calculation of 
the marginal revenue product of lend ie elwaye difficult, if not impoe-
•ible. The other •pproech to the fair rent l a eocio-economicel. Accord· 
ing to Dr. Schickele. one criterion of the optimum income distribution 
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1• tha uaubaietenc• principle~ lllilch ••tabli•hea thet ••ch mambar or • 
eociety ehould heve eccaea to employment thet will yield e minimum eccapt· 
ebl• level of living (11. p. 45). Poverty 1• in pert a eocial reeponei-
bility, aince if e man eennot earn enough to support his remily. it 1• 
likely that inetitutional etructure either prevents him from receiving 
•het he deearv•• or prevent• him from d91nonstreting hie potentiel ability. 
Relating this reasoning to the tenancy problems,• conclude thet if th• 
tenant'• living 1• round ta be below the acceptable aubeiatence level, 
then the rent must have been exceaelv• (unfair rent). Thue, feir rent 
in thia context maene the guarantee of a minimum acceptable level or 
living to the tenants. 
l . High rental ratea 
Wera th• rante in Taiwan unfair before the reform? Let us look et 
the ectual rental r•tas fir•t. By rentel rate 1• ~aent e ratio between 
r-ent which goea ta the landlord and the total yield. The high•r the 
rentel rate. the lower the tenent'• income. 
The rough end widely eaeUtl'led rental rate wes 50 per cent . A eurvey 
carried out in 1927 revealed that the evere~e rental reta or double crop 
paddy land ..,,. 48 per cent. that o' eingle crop paddy land wea 46 par cent, 
end thet of dry land was 28 par cent. A •imiler survey 118e made again 
in 193?. Thia ti~• the figure• were ea followea 49 per cent for paddy 
lend end 33 per cent for dry lend. We learn, then, that rental rates or 
paddy land were close to 50 per cent. In the case of dry lend, however, 
the rantel rate• wara considerably lo~•r (12, p. 18). 
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Th• eame •ituetlon continued into the poet-war period . Teng, ~ui-•un, 
Chief of th• Lend Oiviaion, Joint Commiaaion on Rural Reconatruction 
(10, p. 27) report• thet it • not unueual to find rante or 50 par cent 
or more or the totel harvest. A 50- 50 divie!on we• most common, but e 
60-40 d1vie1on wea not exceptional on more fertile lend. In some of the 
oet densely populated fertile land, the landlord• took 70 per cent or 
the total herveat. In feet, rental retea in Ta111JSn ~•re emong the highest 
in the rer Ee1t (13, p. 21) . 
~any authors aeaert that levels auch •• theae ere indeed ebova those 
werrented by the ergirn1l productivity or the land. ( van e for•iQn ob-
earvar like Beta (14, p. 165) declerea that the roriner rent• in T•iw•n 
ware nrer above the level juatifiad by the productivity of the eoil. n 
It w a alee ob•arved that, attar paying euch e high rental charge, whet 
wee left for tenants wae not sufficient to provide the minimum •••entiela 
of living. A gr1n1t meny rer~era had little or no rice to cerry them from 
one crop to another. In the principal rice-growing areas more then 30 
per cant or them tell into thia cetaoory end in the eouthernmo•t part of 
the ielnnd the proportion wee eppro~imataly 70 per cent (14, p. 165). 
Thus. the level of rant•l charge in T• iwin prior to the recent reforM 
mey be eefely judged ea exorbitant (8, pp . 29- 29) fro~ either criterion. 
2. MJroncled rent"--rigid rent 
"Ironclad rent" ~••n• o fixed rantel cherga ragerdleea of the yield. 
Aa the yield varies considerably from yaor to ya•r in the agricultural 
production, thie practice forced tenants to offer eometimee even e 
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eejority or th• product to landlord• in th• yeore of natural dieeater. 
Rant •hould be ello11ed to be variable in the eaae of crop failure• ceu1ed 
by netur•l fore••· Otharwi•• kh• tenant•• minimum level or living may be 
thr eatened . 
3. Extr•-rentel payment• 
A•ntel payment• prop•r ••re not all that tenant• had to bear. Some 
landlord• charged rent on by-products. So~• required tanenta to make 
rent deposit• to aefaguerd their intere•t. Still oth•r• urged tenant• to 
pey rent.a in edvence. All thee• added to the financial di fficul Uea of 
the tenante . ~oreover, personal or hcu•ahold aervic••• • holdover fro• 
feudelietic precticea, ware •till found in eome of the rural ar•••· 
Al eo commonly round ••• the practice of having the tenant• grow bamboo 
end fruit• or reiee chickens end duck• far the landlords ea a tribute. 
Such practice• were in reality en added hiddtn coat to the tenante. 
Perhepa the non-econo~ic impect ie aquelly important here. If 
tenenta era to be •ncoureged to take pride in their work end to become 
r••oectad nuunbars of the community, than faudeliatic practices such ea 
th••• cannot continue. It ie incon•iatent ~ith democracy in that it 
deniee indi vicfuel independence. 
B. Problematic Araee Related to Inaecurity of Tenure 
In addition to the high rental charges, the tan•nts' life .ea 
thre•tanad by the insecurity or their rigfita to ranain on the rer~s. 
The errecta or tenant ineaourity were not limited to "poverty' only. 
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It aleo hindered efficiency in agricultural production, end thereby pre .. ed 
the inco~• to tha lower level and thu• contributad to a vicioue circle. 
Probl•~• of insecurity of tenure have been centered on the following 
t~o eubject•• (•) length or leeae, end (b) for~ of contrect. 
1. Length of lee•• 
rerming ie e complex bueine•• with e alaw turnover of inveatment . 
Uauelly it take• eeverel ye•r• to reap the benefit• of ao • 1 portent in-
veatmante or improve ante. A lono production period end long-term planning 
horizon •re often prereouleit•• for efficient fer ing. The t11118 span ra-
quired for the realization or inveet ante or iJnprov91!'ent.a ie c•lled the 
planning horizon (8, p. 12). Relating thia planning horizon to the aecu-
rity of tenure, we can eey \het the le•• aecure the tenant'• e~pectetiona 
ere, aitheT on hi• etay on that ••ma term or on the compan9etion or un-
realized investment• mada by him, the l'llOre likely thet he i• to adopt auch 
project• hev!ng ehorter planning horirona end leee efficient reeulte. Such 
• c•ee is illuetreted in figure 1, where cepitelized total returns expected 
by a cultivator from 80me invest ent or by the use or om• particular fart11-
ing prectice ere shown on the vertical axia •• related to time, ehown on 
the horizontal axie (8, pp. 11-12). 
T.+..J. .,._~ ... "'"s 
.&f-i-c.tJ. 
A --------- ------ -- -------.,E 
c -- ---------,~ 
0 L-- ----~-------~--:--- , ,_ .,.-
C, A, A.i 
rigure l. (xpect•d planning hor17un 
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In rigur• 1, B represent• one production choice, •ey, rio• grow1n~. 
r 1• another production choice, eey, livestock production. B ind1catea 
that oomp•r•d to the other choice (E). thi• production choice require• • 
•horter planning horiron (oc1) but emeller returMa (DC). In tel'ftle or rice 
production, the tenant he• to welt about four month• (oc1 ) to be abl• to 
reeo OC dollera 111>rth or ruturne. Similerly, E ehowe that if ha raise• 
liveetock, he •uet welt longer but the return• ere alao higher, i.e., a.ore 
etricient. Tenente who•• exp•ctatione could not stretch to cover OA1 ere 
forced to adopt e quickly-raelizad but lees efficient production choice, e. 
It i• only after h• become• aura •bout ataying on the farm to reap it• 
benefit• or obtain due compensation from the landlord that he 1• willing 
to adopt a more efficient production method repreeentad by E. That i• to 
eey, the degra• ot security determine• the ectuel production choeen. Th• 
lllOre eacure hie axpeQtation, the longer the plenninQ horizon and the more 
efficient hie terming will be. If he ia extremely ineecure, he might try 
to reap the moat from the lend during his short period or expectetione. 
Thie often reeulte in the so-celled "exploitative agriculture" which in-
vite•, among other thinga , eoil exploitation. Lastly, length or le••• need 
not be infinitely long. All that theory requires ia that it ahould be 
aurficiently long to cover the moat profitable plenning horizon. In tar~• 
of rigure 1, if B end E exhauet all the poe•ible choicee, than OA
1 
IMIY be 
taken ea a norm pf length or le•••· To ••tend it to, eay, oA2, i• not 
necessary. 
Prior to the r•form, the 110et cminon practice we• tenancy from year 
to year. Under this type of tenancy COf'\tract, no epeoification W88 M8d8 
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on the length or lease. Landlord• wanting to terminate the contract 
were able to do eo by notifying t.ha tenente, in advance, et the dete 
fixed by local cueto~. So precticelly all tanenta enjoyed a one year 
expectation only. Thue, eometim•• they hed to forego longer-term, yet 
more artlcient, production choioH. Therefore, the hervaat wea often 
1111all and the income ahered meegar. Hare ~• witn••• both inefficient 
t•r•ing and poverty axiating aide by aide. 
The aocial i•pect of the ineecurity i• equally crucial. Th• eema 
roaaon that di9couraged the tenant'• interest in longer-term and 1110ra 
profitable production choices, alao worked to prevent hi~ from being 
interested in social iife. He juat could not think of himaalf •• a m .. -
ber of the aociety. He belonged to no particular aoc1ety. Therefore, 
having no definite idea or hie length or atey, ha aho•ed no intaraat in 
participating in eociel affair•, not to mention taking any poaitiv• 
action• on a:uninunity development. Dr. TilDfaOn• h•• aaid that (B, p. 13}1 
' the tenant remily continuelly reced *1th the poeaibility or eviction 
cannot develop socially, acono~ic•lly, or politically." 
2. Form• of contract 
Between the two form• of contract, written end verbal, the latter 
prevailed in Taiwan. About nine out or ten contract• were varbel (10, P• 27). 
Ad~ittedly, th•r• ie nothing wrong with a verbal contract eo long ea it 1• 
a clear etraightrorwerd agra .. ant. Unfortunataly thia qualification ia 
rarely mat. (eQacielly when both parti•• differed ae greatly in aocial 
end econo•ic paaitiona ea did the landlord• end t.,ante in Taiwan, verbcl 
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contract• meant elinoet nothing. Subeequant unnaceeeery dieputa• were all 
too frequent, end when dieputas eroea, it wee ueually the tenant• who 
were th• loaers. 
All in all, tenant• 11111r• antirely at the mercy or their landlords. 
Thay enjoyed no protection. As a consaqu.nce, they did not work hord or 
utilize the raaourcee efficiently. Thay knew that increaead production, 
eriaing from the fruit• of their hard .ork and skillful management, merely 
gev• lendlorde enother opportunity to charge more. Thu• , one of the 1DOat 
powerful weapons which puahea an aconomy fcrlll!lrd , the profit incentive, 
had faded completely from tenant•' econontio lite. 
rirntlly, in order to •how how un'8vareble end unbeerabla to the 
tenant• the former tenancy arrangement• ••re, tenancy diaputaa brought 
up for aattl81Rent in the pre-reform period are cla1aifiad by their nature 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. Tenancy dispute• by nature (1911-1940) e 
YHr Rent el iaeuea Tenure rights Other ieeuee Total iaeuea 
(Caaee) (~) (Caaee) (~ ) (Ceeee) (%) (Casee) (%) 
1911-1929 568 66 217 25 70 a 855 100 
1930 273 44 244 40 99 16 616 100 
1931 504 54 299 32 126 14 929 100 
1932 403 48 331 39 112 13 846 100 
1933 511 515 300 33 109 12 920 100 
1934 325 45 :us 44 79 11 719 100 
1935 337 50 265 40 64 10 666 100 
1936 200 41 240 50 4:3 g 483 100 
1937 205 56 142 39 20 6 367 100 
1938 119 49 98 41 24 10 2·U 100 
1939 174 59 102 38 19 J 295 100 
1940 1,271 85 220 15 11 l 1,295 100 
Tot el 4,890 58 2, 773 33 776 9 8,439 100 
e 
Sources ( 1, p. 34). 
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It con be seen thet dlaputea centered around rent• end tenure righta . 
Rental iesuea occupied 58 per cent of the totel ieauea end tenure riljlts, 
33 oer cent. Among the rentel i••u••, the moat freQuantly diaputed topic• 
were rent reduction end feilure to pey rants which recorded l,9JJ end 
1,819 caae• reapactivaly, in 1911-1940. Cancellation of contracts before 
their axpir•tion date lll!IS the one llith the highest frequency in the cate-
gory of tenure rights. During 1911-1940 altogether there occurred l,199 
cesea of thie nature (1, p. 34) . 
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III. THE GOALS AND TARGCTS 
In Chapter It, the problematic are•• heve been diacueeed . These 
were the unsetiafectory pheaes of the pre-rerorm tenency ayetem. Since 
such diaaetiafectione could nri•• only after contrasting the exieting 
eituetione with some aort of satiafeotory eituetiona, wa might well aek 
IUhat th••• eatiafectory or ideal aituatione era. Coals of the tenancy 
1mprov81Jl'8nt meaaurea rafar to theaa ideal aituoti ona, •hich ere presented 
in terms of income distribution, production, and aociel goals and targets. 
A. Income Oietributlon Goel and Teroete 
l . ~ore agusl income dietrlbution ea e goal 
rrom the neceaaary conditiona for economic development end beeic 
economic functions of tenancy improvement dlscusaad in Chapter I, it ie 
clear that the tenancy i~prova"'9nt Al8esurea muat be directed toward mora 
equal income diatrlbution. 
Two criteria are moat co1\\ITIOnly uaed to measure the equitabllity of 
income distribution. Ona ie tha functionel income dietribution theory, 
*hich atetee thet tha factor reward ahould ba determined by the amrginal 
productivity of eech factor. If the factor ia paid by the product then 
each factor will receive that part or tha output •hic:h correspond• to 
ita merg1nel prod.Jct . If paid with money, ea ia ueuelly tha cese, then 
the price of the rector service ~ill be equal to ite marginal revenue 
product. The other criterion ie aacio-economicel and etama from a aub-
aiatence oriented point of vie•. The critar on hare ia whether the 
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n1.110b•r of persona in the connunity whose lev•l or liv!na fella belo• en 
ecceptebl• etendard or aubaiatance ha• been reduced to a pr•cticel minimum 
{ll, p . •6)0 
Actual observation• on the pra-rafo~ income diairibution between 
tanente end landlords revealed that the product wea not shared in proper• 
tion to the contribution mede by •ech party. Nor we• it equitable in tte 
face or the extreme miaery end poverty thet the tenant• were burdaied 
•ith. It follows that e tenancy improveinent meeeur• auch ea ttie proorem 
under etudy llhould heve a more equel income distribution ea a goel of 
prime inaportence. 
Vica-preaident Chen Cheng, under lllhoae suc>ervieion the program wee 
c•rried out, celivered a apeach before the annual rar~•r•' Dey meeting in 
T•iwen on february 4, 19~9, two montha before the inception of the pro-
grem. The title of the speech reode d ••• to implemant rent reduction, to 
incr•••• production, ee .. 11 es to improve the farmer• ' living" (15-16, 
p . 99). Also~ on another occeaion, he eaida 
••• '101111 the fermera toll so bitterly throughout the yaer end 
etill l'lev• not enough to eupport themselves. It is only natural 
ti-et they do not work herd. Therefore the i11plementetion of the 
37. 5 per cent Ferm rent limitetion progrem could ••• improve the 
rermers' living and incr•••• the production or food. (15-16, 
pp . 101-102) 
2. Income dietribution tergete 
The goal or more eQuel income distributi on 1•, in e aenae, one of 
the ultimete goala tolf8l'd lllhich every policy end program ia eventuelly 
directed. It ia the •co11UJ1on• goel of all diatr1but1ve polici•• end 
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programs. In contrast, thare might be "•pacific" goals or aech perti-
culer policy or progra~ . Th••• pacific goal• muet be a treneletion or 
the "cOl".'ll!lon" goal to eui t the epecial need of the individual program. 
Being such, they must be varied from policy to policy end from progre• 
to progulll. Thi• 1a the elraedy mentioned concept of "target verleblea . " 
Or exprea•ed differently, they ere ands-in-vie• to be eccompliehed by 
that particular policy or progrem. 
~hat were the targete or the orogrem under etudy concerning income 
distribution? The direction of tha income redistribution 1188 cleer1 
the income should be transferred from landlords to the tanenta. How much 
income transformation did the progrem intend to oocomplieh? To ens~•r 
this queetion is to identify the tergeta. 
Theoretically, the errrount to be tranaferred would be beead either on 
the functional rair rent or on the eubeistence level or living. However, 
thie yea prectic•lly impoasible to work out. The eetuel figure adopted 
e• the target for the prooran iuee an incr•e•• in tanenta' income of 12.5 
oer cent of the total yield, 1.a. , rent~•• reduced from the pre-reform 
••ti ete of 50 par cent to 37.5 per cent or the total product (Appendix, 
The rarm Rant Reduct.ion to 37 . 5~ Act, Article 2). 
At thie point it 1• appropriate to introduce the other target, 
namely income stability or a guarentee or minimum income. In the pre-
reform yaera, incomes of some tenant• fluctuated widely frcm year to year 
due to (•) the rigid, eo-called "iron-clad" rent practice end (b) in-
••curlty or tenure right•. The importance of income atebilizetion to 
tenenta ia more fully realized if we recall that they lived et about the 
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bare subaiatence leval. ror the•• poverty-striken paopla, e smell de-
craeae in incoITTa would 81laily become e deeth-blo~. Thia target provides 
hnenta with minimum her of atervat1on, i.e., with medmum eeeurence or 
en incoma neceasery to 1119et the eubsi1tence level of living. 
B. Production Coal end Target• 
The Quotation• from Vice•preaident Chan Chang in the preceding eec-
tion indicete that the progrem wee a duel-purpose one. The inco~e redie-
tr ibution espect of the goela he• elraedy been developed in the lest 
aaction. Thia aeetion deela with the other goal, that of increeea• in 
agricultural production. Strictly apeeking, an increase in agriculture! 
production 1e the epecific target or the progrem trihich could be broadened 
to form the over.ell, ultimete goal of production--increase in national 
product. rollowing th• procedure in the leet section, we ehell etart 
~1th th!• "cornat0n" production 9oel first end then turn to the "specific" 
tergeta or the progrem relevant to the production goel . 
1. meximum netionel product ea en ultime\e goal 
The goal of mexi•um national product raQuirae that the national 
product be maximized under the praeant condition• of technology end 
resourc••· This 1• another way or eeying that resources 11tUSt be al-
located in euch a way that they yield the aema marg1nel revenue product 
throughout every line or production in the eociaty. In ehort, "maximum 
netionel pro-duct " ia the aama •• "optimum reaource allocation• or "effi-
cient production." 
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2. Increase in agricultural production aa e target 
Ir, through the program, th• incentive to wo~k and the willin~ness 
to improve each individual'• lot have been rastored to the tenant, then 
the increase in agriculture! production may be expected . And eince 
Taiwan'• econoey relie• on agriculture rather heavily, the increeee in 
egricul t urel production would undoubtedly increeaa the netionel product 
conaiderebly. ~oraover, eince en inoraesa in egriculturel production 
•ill bring about an increased coneumption or gooda end aarvicee of non-
agricultural origin by tenants. the production of thaee goods and aervice• 
will be etimulated ~nd their markets expended. Thus, an increaee in agri-
cultural production is capable of acting ae the terget- -the enda-in-view- -
to further serve the ultimate goal, namely , maximum netional product. 
Hom Much or en lncrea•e in egricultural production wee da•ired es 
the tar9at to be ettained by the program? Unlike the caaa in income r e-
distribution, no specirication Mte mode for this target . Thia is undar-
standoble becouae, though these two •are liated aide by aide as the major 
goals of the progra~ in the quotetion• they did not carry the e2llfte weight 
in the minds of politicol laadere. Tha focua or tenancy improvement 
probl ems waa traditionally on the income distribution . Hence, the cure 
for the rural poverty aituation occupied a predominant place in the plan . 
In contraet, the goal of increased oroduction iues rather casually recognized 
by relot1vely few, and never succeeded in attracting the appropriate atten-
tion it deserved . 
This section may be concluded •• followaa (a) the increaea in agri-
cultural production w•• expected end deairad, (b) th1• increase wili 
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furth•r contribute to ganerel economic prosperity and develop~ant, end 
(c) in echievlng the target of agriculturcl production increeee•, pro-
viding incentives to te.nante to 1mprovo their economic atetue would pley 
• central role as en end-in-vie~ to tha above target. Than, stronger 
incentive• to work herder and to improve production efficiency ~ay ba 
edded ea e secondary terget hare. 
3. more security in tenure right• ea a target 
Mor• security in tenure righta 1• the other tergst related to egri-
culturel production. It hes already bean demonstrated that agricultural 
production under tsnency is in part determined by the degree of security 
the tenant enjoys . The l••• secure tenure right• ere often aasocieted 
with leea efficient farming . The tenant will h9ve a smaller total product 
end hia ehere of tha output (his income) ia likely to be smell elao . The 
crucial part played by the securi ty in tenure rights thua become• obvious . 
Ite erfact apraeda out from production to distribut i on end to the level 
of living. 
C. Social Target• of the Program 
Aaide from the economic target•, the program had some eocial tet'geta, 
too . The feudalistic •l•~anta of the rural community, like personal or 
household aervicee by tenenta, e ·e not conducive to individual independence . 
rurther, the cleea conflict between tenant• end landlord• wea the ceuae 
of much of the politicel egitetion end civil di .. eneion. If e danocratic 
and progressive rural Taiwan is wanted, than ell these undesirable 
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element• must be eliminated. Thu• elimination or reudelistic holdover• 
end minimization or social conflict ee ~ell ea en increase in (e) human 
independence end (b) interest end participation in aocial development by 
tenants becaMe the eociel targets of the progrem. 
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IV. THE ~EANS 
ffl eene ere tha measure taken to close the gap bat~ean probl emat i c 
ere:ss in existing situations end the targate. Usually many means ere 
evaileble for achi eving given targets, i.e., maene ere veriables. 
Thee• veriablee mey b• divided into tlllO aepereta but related cete-
oorlae, i.e., tha lnetrumantel verieblas end th• structural veriablee. 
Structural verieblea relate to the etructUJ:ee feshionad by decree end 
lagi•letion. Referring to agriculture, the existing agrarian etruotures 
era , or couree, the product of the people in the pest and may ba changed 
by the people of tha present whenever they eaa fit. The agrarian reform, 
of ~hich the land reform le a part, is the proca~e of eltering the egrar• 
i•n etructurae through the peaaing of n•• decrees end l•gieletion. 
Obviously men ' • ectione cen teka place only within the freme1r10rk of 
the •tructurea. Therefore, the structures ere besie in the sense that 
they govern economic ectivltiee and control beheviora of inatrumentel 
variables, auch ea interest retas, wage rates, renta l r a tee, capital in-
vestments, etc. Hence , structures era influential in determining th• 
emount end the •ey that the raaourcea cen be combined end utilized . 
These , in turn, eat the level for the f1nel outcome of the economic acti-
vity--productivi ty end netionel income. 
hlle we ere awere that there era many means to achieve given tergata, 
we shall concentrate, in this chapter, on the meene which ware actually 
edcpted. Tha alternative meena will be brought out when wa ep~r•iae 
the effectivaneea of these maene in the next chapter. 
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The 37.5 per cent farm rent limitation program or 1949 in Teilll9n i• 
the meeeur• to change the tentincy eepect or the agreri•n structure• in 
eccordance with the target• eat forth in the previous chepter. Th• 
program ie legally becked by Th! Regulation• Governing tha Lease ot Private 
rarM Lands in Teiaen ae quoted in Tang (10), end a coaipanion piece, !h! 
rarm Rent Reduction to 37.Sf Aot ae quoted in Teng (10). ilhich ware pro-
mulgated on April 14, 1949, and June 7, 1951, r .. pectively. or the•• two, 
the second 1• more draatic end complete, end therefore will be the one 
referred to in thi• etudy. Only the principal feature• of the program 
are presented balo•. Reader• ~l•hing to grasp th• whole picture ahould 
rare~ to the Appendix. 
A. Provieione Directed tollllrd Income Target• 
1. Rent li~1tat1on ea e meena to increeea tenant•' incoll!e 
Rent ae cut from the µre-reform eat1m•t• of 50 par cent or ~or• to 
37.5 per cant or lees. Th• exect meanino or 37.5 per cent fer rent 
limitation ie given in Article 2 ae followe1 
The f•r• rental r•t• ahall not exceed 37.5% of the total annual 
••in crop harvest. If the rental exceed• that rete, it ehould be 
reduced to 37.5 • If the rate i• below 37.5%, it ehall not be 
reieed. 
The main crop ee referred to in the proceeding eection denotes 
.uch crop which ie moetly olanted eccording to the local farm-
im) practice or such rotation crop• actually planted end the main 
crop herveet denote• the main harveat or auch crop for the pur-
poae of which it ie planted. 
Obviously thie is a price ceiling. Hera the highest price for the 
uae or lend ia eat at 37.5 per cent or the total ennuel a1n crop herveat. 
The total annual •ein crop herveat 1• the eetiamtad average yield of the 
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main crop end 1• hereafter called the etandard yield. Such a tigure wee 
eat1meted tor each plot end the rent 1• baaed on thie aatimnte. Being an 
average baaed on peat production, th• etenderd yield do•• not vary fro~ 
year to yaer with the herveat . Notice also that the rent i• in term• of 
the major crop even though aome otheT crop might be reiaad. Since the 
etander d yield ia a fixed emount, the rent thus determined !a e fixed 
amount . ~oraover, the proviaion ilftPli•• thet future production incraeeee 
due to herder work end more skillful menegement will eolely belong to the 
tenants . Thu• thi• proviaion may increeee tanenta• income in tmo weya . 
One is en immediate, direct effect coming from the limiteti on of ferm 
rent . The other h the aacondery, indirect effect originating in produc-
tion incraeae atimuleted by the rent ceiling. 
2. Peduction end ex•=pticn ct rent e• a meene to guisrentae minimum inc0111e 
It h~• been pointed out that tanente lived et th• mercy of lendlorde 
end often were not guaranteed even e bero aubsiatenca. In order to echiave 
aociel justice. 1.a., in order thet tanent• might receive et leeet e mini-
mum emou~t of necaaaitiae in ysara of bed h•rvaat due to the unfavorable 
netur 1 forces beyond men'• control, Ar ticle ll provide• that1 
(e) hen a harveet i• amall ea e reault or natural ceteatrophe• or 
uncontrollable diaastare, end l&lhen the loae i• lass than 70 par cant or 
the atenderd yield. the r erm Tenancy Committee, diich ite• set up under 
the proviaion of Article 3, ehell decide the r•te or reduction . 
(b) Ir the loea 1• more then 70 par cent, then the tenant ehall be 
exempted from paying rant for thet yaer. 
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B. Provisions Directed towerd the Production Tergete 
l. Mln1mUlft length of la8ea •• a meana to promote afticient terming 
Aa developed in Chapter II , the length ot l•••• ie • cruoiel factor 
in datermin1no raeource allocation end fer~ing prectica. After etudylng 
the axieting ferm eyet9111a end poaaible anterpri••• that might be intro-
duced into Tai...anaee agriculture, the conclualon a reached that eix 
year• (Article 5) ~ould ba long enough ta meat the expectation ho~izon 
for advantegaoua raeourca allocation end atr1ciant farming practice. 
2. Protecting tenanta eo that they mat raranin on the farm 
~oraover , the leaaa 1e ranall/abla. Th• condition• under ~hich lend-
lorda oen evict the tenant• .. ra severely restricted (Articles 17 through 
20 and Article 25) so that far practical purpoaea t~anta may regard their 
tar~ or occuoancy ea lerting indatinltaly end may act accordingly. Th••• 
proviaiona carry spacial eaninQ to Teiweneaa tenant• bee1auea rapid popu-
l•tion gro~th coupled *1th the lack or job opportuniti•• within end with-
out agriculture ha• reaultad in keen competition for renting evailabla 
land, end thie, in turn, h•• cauaed th•m to remain in the vulnerable 
group. era there no provleiona of thi• sort, lendlorda M>uld take every 
opportunity to evict pra•ant tenant• and th• "black market" laaaee M>uld 
eoon eri••· The final outcome of this unheopy occurrence 111auld be the 
complete collepaa of the program. 
3. Co!!!peneetion on the unexheuated investment 
Aa a rule, efficient fermln; requires aubatantial inveetmenta. And, 
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in moat inatenc•a, the heavier th• inveatment the alower the capital 
tur nover. Unleae tenant• are aaeurad of compensation on the unexheuatad 
part or investment inada by them, they lllill not b• int•r••ted in invaateent, 
espacie lly investment or the heavier and slower turnover type. Aa a ra-
ault, agricultural development would be alo~ed down conaiderably . It 
ia in recognition of thia need that Article 13 of th• Act concerning 
co~penaetion ~•• provided. The first pert of Article 13 reeds1 
The lease• ~ey rreely make any apaciel improvement• on the farm . 
· hen the lease expire• and the lend ta returned, the lessor ehould 
give companaetione to the l••••• for such improva111enta, but only 
tor thoae oarta of the i~provB111ente shich era •till useful et the 
time or ~eking the compensation . 
Thus the program encour•g•• tenant• freely engaged in •keeping the 
original quality and utility of the term unimpaired~ and aleo in increee-
ing "tha productivity or ferming capacity" (Appendix , Article 13). The 
upshot of thia •ould be (•) the eKteneion of tenants' planning horizon• 
end (b) incr•••• in tennnta' capital inveetmente on terae with reeultent 
incr•••• in erficiency. 
It ahould be pointed out, however, that the Act feila to make it 
explicit juat how the coinpenaation may be evaluated. There ere three 
general methods of calculation (8 , p. 20)1 (• ) compensation mey be baaed 
upon original coat of variou• i~provement•J (b) it may be baaed upon the 
replac81'1ent coats or, (c) it may be baaed on the added return which the 
improveftlent will bring to future cultiV11tora. 
Each of th••• hea ite own probleme. ~hen there ere price changaa 
during the period covered, the former tiwo method• will bring windfall 
g•ine to BOflla end correeponding lo• ••• to others. Th• eddad return 
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method is the most eound one in theory, but it is difficult to •••••• 
the vDlua or eddad returns in practice. 
c. Provisions Directed toward Social Tergata 
l . C~ncalletion of extre burdena 
In the pre-reform deye, in addition to the rent, tanente were often 
eskad to pey (e) rent in advance end (b) dapoait money. These are made 
illagel in Articles 12 end 14. Moreover, ell obligetione aech party muat 
adhere to ere now clearly liated in the ct. There is no room for th• 
taudaliatic holdover•, or axtre burdens to be put on tenant•' shoulders. 
Tenants will gradually come to realize individual independence. 
With added security in tenure righta, they will develop themaalve• toward 
the goel of being reepecteble •ember• of the society end begin to partici-
pate in community development. 
2. Establiahment of ferm tanency cont1111tteaa 
Aa shown earlier, many conflicts end dieputes developed bat~ean 
tenants end landlord• prior to tha rerorm. Of course, these could be 
brought to tha court for settlement. Ho~~ver, appeal• to the court take 
time end raQuir• money. moreover, tenant• were not eccuetomad to court• 
•nd sho••d ignorance ea well •a fear towerd thi• way of settlement. The 
government, too, wee enxiou• to ••• th• program fully effective •nd 
desired to obviate th••• conflict• and to provide a maene for their 
aattlament. It ta under these circumetencae that the aoeci•l committaaa 
.. re set up to provide for aettlement or the tenancy disputea . 
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According to ~rticle 3, the ttMO major objective• of such colllllitte•• 
are (e) to inaure thet ell farm tenancy contract• •r• made to follow 
etrictly the direction• giv•n in the Act •nd (b) to aettla diaputa• 
eri•i"9 in lendlord•tenant relationahipa. 
It 1• seen that through enforce•ent of the program (e) the tenancy 
arreng•••nta were brought under clo•• auperviaion. and (b) tenure right• 
were carefully protected. Na more would tenenta euf ter from ebu••• of 
landlords. The reform h•• guerentaed tenant• with return• for their 
reaaurcee contributed. It has injected the tenant• with the incentive• 
to produce more end to batter their econo~ic •• well •• aocial poeitiane. 
It hee elaa rurniahed the beaia for o~oduction improvament, eapacially 
for the long-term inveatment. at kind of reectiona ~ve tenant• aho .. d 
in resource use and production~ lllhat kind of effects he• the reform given 
t o the over-all acalomic development of Teiwan? Theea question•, with 
others, will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
v. EVALUATJO 
Succeaa end feilure of the progrem muet be judged in light of it• 
goela end tergete. ~ · conclude from Chapter Ill that the proQrem •ea 
e multi-purpose one with three major goals end even more targets. 
tretead of appreiaing the program in terms of eech end every terget 
end goal, however, we propoee to analy1e the erfecta of the program in 
terms of tlltO major ter9eta--increaaea in tenant's income and incrsaaea in 
agricultural production. It i• clear from the ebova ergument that the 
progr8m was ceoeble of echievJng other tergete. Thia is eapecielly ao 
in the ergument of the lest cehpter where the atreightforwerdn as of the 
meena--the progrem--tovrerd thee other i"rgata ia &ho~n . In contreet, 
the effects of the progra~ uoon two targets mentioned ebove ere not 
altogether carteln end plein . Hsre the more dietant, long-run effect• 
may heve e quite different picture then the immediate or short-run affect•. 
The need for diatinguiahing short-run end long-run effect• of the 
program on theae two target• become• epp•rant through an enelyei• of the 
program '• imoect on the pattern or raaource cllocetion. Thie ia e non-
t•rget verieble er the program and ie a crucial one, for the level of 
income la determined by the productivity, i.e., by the way tha reaourcas 
are combined •nd used. Hee the progrem changed the combination end 
utilization of ra1ourc .. in tenente' terming? ~~at kind of impact will 
th1• chenga in the pattern of reeource uea have on the egriculturel ea 
well ea the over-811 development of Taiwan ~~et are the shortcoming• of 
the progrem? lllhet other step• might be auggeeted in order to ineure the 
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program'• enduring aucceae in the context of both narrower agricultural 
develop~ent end broader economic development? 
Thie chapter will proceed with a diacuasion of eccompliehmente of 
the prooram in term• of income and production increeaea . Thia will be 
followed by a diacuseion of the points raised in question for~ ebove. 
finally, the chapter concludes with the praa.-.teti on of the further steps 
ne.cfed. 
A. Accompliehllttnt or the Drogrem in Terms of Income Distribution 
1. Incraeae in tanenta' income 
The merit of the proorem in this eepect beco~e• clear when one con-
siders whet the aMtro crop• meant to the tanonta lllho had baan euffaring 
from etarvetion, disease, and miaary. The principle of diminiahinQ 
marginal utility holds thet the marginal utility decree••• ae the unite 
one po•••s••• incre•••· Thu• it may be ee1d thet the maroinal utility 
would be much greater for the poor who h•• little then for the rich who 
already hea much. An additional beakat of rice, for inetance, might 
hold e key poaition in the lira or th• tanmnte who were habitoally short 
or rice between crape. In feet~ in the poor year• many tenente 11ere 
forced to borrow e basket of rice et e high rate of intareat until the 
ne~t crop wea harve•ted. In this senee, the meaning of their gain, no 
Metter how Blftall the increment •1cjit be. can hardly be overestimated. 
But the effect or the rant reduction on tenant•' incomes does not 
atop hara. Further increase in tanent•' inco519a would be expected through 
the provision of incentive• to produce ~ore . Thia incentive arose bacauae 
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the 37 . 5 par cent rental reta wea a fixed rant end tha security of tonure 
rights eaeur ad them the wmola fruite of their labor in axe••• of the 
atanderd harvest. Increeaed production 1.10uld be •~ected under the 
Act because tanente • income• have increased end they are certain thet 
they can r eceive the r•••rd for whet they put into lend, end therefor• 
they ere willing to eoend pert of the increment or their income• for the 
production purposes . 
Juat how much reduction in rent woe mad• or how much increaae in 
tenant• ' incomee wae brought ebout ea • reeult ot the pro~ram? Rem1111ber. 
the target here was en increment being 12.S par cant of the total yield. 
According to the aurvey carried out in 1950 by the Chineaa Raaeerch 
Inetitute of Land Economica. the average increase in rice-gro•inQ tenente • 
eherea wee ebout 660 kilogreme per hectnre (12, p . 31) . Assuming everege 
size of ferme in that yeer to be 1.4 hecterae, and converting the above 
figure into par family bea1s, the ri•a in tenants' income was ebout 900 
kilogrema . Since the totel yield a::iuld be estimota~ ea somewhere around 
S,700 kilograms. the 900 kilogrem increment would be about 16 per cent of 
tha total yield. 
Incransed incomse moy ba used either on coneumption or on production. 
It is the money apant on coneumption that d1rectly contributes to the level 
of living . One report (17, pp. 37-38) atetea thet, in 1950 , ebout one-
thitd of tha ircraosad iocom~ wee spent on living e~penaaa emong which 
" food and clothing" were the lergest item• to drew tenant•' money. Again, 
the proportion apant on living expenses is found raleted to the aize or 
ferma, reflecting the herd-praesed living of the small-holding rermars. 
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In the ceaa of emelloat ferm9 (leee then on hectere) ell of the increesed 
inco resulting from the rent reduction wee absorbed by the living ex-
en ••· hil in the caoa or econd smalleetfttrms (on to t~o hacteree), 
farmera ao nt 63 par cent for this purpoae (18, p. 240). 
Thia videnca ie cona1etent with the hyoath sis thet the orogrllil 
h s had the effect of incraeei ng incoNe• end lavale of living for tanante . 
Other pro9r an • •·9· , the recover y end rehabilitetion pr ogr am• of the 
QOver nment, mey elao be operating hara. Available atatiatice also reveal 
that tha•• initlel increesea in income end the level of living heva con-
tinuad in the years th•t follo d. Thia is sho111n in Tabla J . 
T !:Ile 
Veer 
1950 
1954 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
a 
b 
Oieooseble incom , consumnt!on evpendituree, end 5avirg• per 
farm family in 1952 conatunt dollere8 
Oia,,osaMa Consl.lnption 
i ngom• expenditure• Sevinga 
(N. T. ) (1 ) (tJ . T. t ) ("' ) ( . T. ) ('%) 
8,258 100 7,639 92 . 5 620 7. 5 
9,100 100 8,611 94 . 6 619 5.4 
8,708 100 e.031 92 .2 677 1 .a 
10,078 100 9,110 90 . 4 968 9 . 6 
8,560 100 7,336 85.7 1,224 14. 3 
9,743 100 e.1as 84 . 0 1,557 16. 0 
10,827 100 9,280 85. 8 1,542 14. 2 
Source t (19. p. HI). 
N. T. 1 New Tai.wen dcllera. Tho currant orfictel rate is N. T.$40 
to u. s . l. 
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The diepoaeble income pet farm remlly increaa•d from B.259 to 
110,027 during 1950 and 1961. The pertition of income emong conaUJRption 
exp•nditur•• and eavin;e ia oleo convincing. The increeae in coneuntption 
expenditure• indicates e higher level or living enjoyed, llhile tha in-
creeee in eevinga, remarkable both in value terms and percentage terms. 
euggeeta the ore•ter ebility to inv•at among rarmera. (~hether the 
savings actually reeched such a high level ie open to question. However, 
an increase In aevino• r.ay ba eafely accepted.) 
2. Inflation and low pric• policy e1 off•ett!ng torces 
IncOflle comparieone in the preceding •action are exoreeeed in terms 
or "real value• becauae or the lnfietion in thoae years. 
Indeed, inflation and resultant loG price policy heve •~~llo~ed part 
or the increase in tenants• income•. Thia ta so baceusa ~hat waa in-
creased wee the tenant•' eheree in reel product. Therefore, if during 
th••• inflationary yeore, th• agricultural prices b•c•~• relatively cheap 
in c01npariaon to other gooda, •• actually h•ppened in Teililln, the far-
mer•' reel incomes shrenk. If the diverQancy beconl9e considerable, 110at 
of the benefit.a tenants derived fro• the program mey be cancelled out by 
this offaettinQ deflation of the velu• or agricultural product• . 
Th• Teiwen••• economy had auf fered from hyper-inrletion aince the 
end of ~·orld er II, which eventually led to the monetary refor~ or 1949 
in Taiwan. Since then the govern~ent h•• become very aeneitive about 
price ~ov .. ant and folloll8d the general low price policy. Naturally, the 
govern111ent'a price control did not exeroi•• equal preseura on ell goods. 
The focua h•e elwaya been on rice end other egriculturel products which 
compri•• ~ha steplea in everyday living. Thie 1• to aay, the general 
low price policy worked to the detriment of fartnera' interests. for the 
goods they eold ware cha8p as compared to the ;oods t.hay bought. The 
rollo~ing table show• severe inflationary tranda, ea wall as the divargency 
between price• or rice end other good•. 
Tebla 4. Comper!aori of rice prica l•vel and genarel price lava!, 
1935-1937=1008 
Year 
1935 
1940 
1946 
1950 
1955 
1957 
• 
Rice price index 
(1) 
97 . 4 
121.6 
20,175 .9 
568.0 
1,735.7 
l,9os.s 
5DVt'C9 I ( 20, p • 183) o 
Ganerel p~ice index 
(2) 
92 .8 
168.2 
10,574.7 
987.1 
2,562.5 
:5,096. 7 
Rel•ti ve price 
(1)/(2) 
1.05 
0. 72 
1.91 
o.sa 
0. 56 
0. 62 
The above unfavorebla price etructure hea baen some~het corrected 
recently. During 1958-1952 the general price level went up ebout. JS 
per cent ~hile price or rice incree••d nearly 60 par cent . Yat there 
•till axi•t both inrletionary power end time-leg in agricultural prices. 
Am long ee they axiat the fermata era likely to be reletively wore• orr. 
Aa inflation dev•lop•. tha1r producte beoome 1110rth relatively less end 
their incomae ahrink . 
In th.ta vein, t.h• 1mportence of correcting tha price etructure to 
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bring egricultural p~l c•• up to par, ea well ea checking the infletionery 
pr•seure baoomea obvioua ea a eana or guaranteeing to th• tenants the 
re•ulta or the program. 
e. Accompliahmant of' the Progr in T rma of Agricultural Production 
In the pravious aection it ••• ergued end ehown that thet progre• 
•ould orovide tenant• with etronge~ incentives end greoter abiliti•• to 
produce more, and that thi• in turn would t'urther increase thair inco~ae . 
How ~uch did the agricultural production 1ncr•••• after the im:plementetion 
of th• program? 
Everywhere in the reports the marked incr•••• in egriculturel produc-
tion i• etre•aed. ror example, Ta"g (10, p. 61) reports thet within the 
alx year span rrom 1947 to 1952. total agricultural proc1lction incr11aeed 
by more than 57 par cent end the productivity per lend unit incrsased by 
nearly 35 per cent. 
Production increese is the r•sult of either •~pension of arable lard 
or Mar• atf!ciant termlno o~ bath. In view of ths rather conetent •r•ble 
lend arae during thaae peat thirty year• (21, Acpendix Table 3) it may be 
concluded that the production increase ie dua largely to ore err1c1ent 
farming. Haieh •nd le• (21, p. 53) giv• us the clue to raeource produc-
tivity in recent yeera. From Tabla 5 thll general up11ard trend in produc-
tivity 1• ••an. (xcept capital productivity, ell •how en increase . Be-
t~een 1950 and 1956, the eggregale resource productivity increeeed ebout 
15 per cent, while the lend productivity par unit of lend eraa increased 
3J per cent. Labor productivity increaeed about 20 par cent . Tha 
trend ror capitnl productivity see • to be declining, but it• level is 
atill relatively high. Later on we ahall hava an opportunity to coma 
beck to tha problem of chengea in 1nd1v1du l resource productivity end 
!ta impl1cationa. Hara we noto that reaourc• productivity was, ;anarelly 
a e klnQ, incraesin; following the progrem. 
Table 5. 
a b 
Indexes of resource productivity in agriculture (1935-1937=100) 
Index of' 
eggragata 
resource 
Year productivity 
1935-1937 100.00 
1945 63. 74 
1950 103.54 
1955 uo. 64 
1956 118.55 
Index of 
lend 
productivity 
per unit 
land eraa 
100.00 
50 . 00 
99.3• 
120. 70 
131.94 
Index of' 
labor 
productivity 
per •Qricul-
turel worker 
100.00 
59.48 
77.01 
92.24 
100.29 
Index of' 
labor 
productivity 
per men-day 
labor input 
100.00 
61.00 
87.00 
98 . 50 
104.50 
• t~ota1 ole agriculture, not only that of tenenta'. 
b Source1 (21, p. SJ). 
Index of' 
capital 
productivity 
100. 00 
175.57 
144.25 
105.17 
110. 06 
In peeeing, it ~ay be added that not only crop production increeaed 
aharoly but the major eide-linaa of Teiw•ne•• agriculture, liveatock end 
poultry production alee increeaed. Between 1949 end 1953. tha number or 
hog• r•i•ed 1110re than doubled, cattle incraeaed 9 per cant end poultry in-
creaeed around 30 per cent (4, pp. 109-110). Theae inerae•e• may be e 
direct result or the program end •ra,in eny ceae, conaiatent with the 
hypothaeie tnet beceuaa or the program, tenant• ere able end willing to 
improve thair own lot. 
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Of courea, t he actual production i ncre ee 1• e combinod outcome or 
various forcaa, euch ea advancement in technology, axpeneion in irr1get1cn 
facilities, etc. The progrem waa merely ona of the rorces but an important 
one. 
lite kno1111 "the meens" conaiet of structural veriablea and inatrumental 
variables. We knom, too, thet the program belong• to the for~ar. After 
the implementation of tha program, the structure of the tenancy system 
chengad in auch e way that now tanente poeeeaaed e stronger incentive to 
work hard end to produce more. Thia incontive. in turn, brought out the 
chengaa in instru~antel variebles, ~hich took ehape or more !ntanaiva 
rar~ing, both in terms of labor and or capital. Thia will be explained 
below. 
The tenant• were willing to produce ~ore, and they had maene to do 
ao . Firat or ell. their income• have now rieen. Pert of tha increeaed 
ineomas would be, without doubt. ueed on the consumption phase. Equally 
true ia that pert or th• increased incoma•. perhaps e greeter pnrtion as 
times peas by, lllOuld cart•inly be inveeted on ferma for improvement 
purpoaea. Their tonura on the land beoema ••cure, for by law, their 
1-.,aaa were of six yeera duration or longer end the landlord could no 
longer evict them et will. Thua, they could be aura of reaping tha benefit 
ot their invaatmente. Secondly. under the rant reduction etetutea, their 
rent wea fixed et 37.5 par cant or the atenderd yield (i.a., e fixed rent) 
and not the ectuel yield horveatad. ao that unan the actual h•rva•t ex-
ceeded the atendard yield they could keep ell such axcaae products for 
themselves end did not heva to •here it lllith landlords. Hence, they spent, 
47 
on the •verege, two-thirds of their 1 ediete 1ncr9i?Ba in incomee ceuaed 
by the enforcement or the program on investment in the farm, espacielly 
on fertilizer. In feet, r rtillzer elone ebeorbed two-fifths or tha 
incraeaed tncanaa . end eo fer 1• th• lergeet 1ole outlet. Thi• 1a 
1hown in Tebla 6. 
Table 6. 
Uae 
8 Use of incre11sed income in 19Ci0 
f'ertilizel'B 
Draft anb1ele 
f'erm 1mplamente 
rood end clothing 
Heelth and education 
Houaing end trenaport 
Amuaemant 
IUacal l eneoue 
Total 
e 
Source: (17, pp. 37-38). 
Percentege 
39. B 
14.2 
12.8 
7.3 
5. 5 
4.8 
2.3 
13.3 
100.0 
Labor has been the moat plentiful resource in Tei~eneee agriculture 
ea diacuased earlier in this atudy. Now equipped 1th stronger incan-
tivaa and higher income, tenant•' ferminQ naturelly moved in the direction 
or lebor inteneified rert11ing eccompeni•d by larger capital 1nputa, ... 
peoielly working cepital. Thi• tn0vemant, dur1"9 1949-1956, 11 indicated 
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Table 7. Indexes of agricultural input•• (19•9:100)b 
Land Le bar orking F'ix•d 
Y•ar ere• input cepit.al capital 
1949 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOO.O 
1950 100.7 101.9 135.8 9•.7 
1951 101.0 103.5 152.6 95.4 
1952 101.3 109.3 182.9 103.3 
19S3 lOtl.9 111.3 199.0 111.e 
1954 101.l 111.2 225.5 122.5 
1955 100.9 109.7 238.0 118.A 
1956 101.3 113.7 250.4 121.4 
a 
Notei hol• agricultural inputa, not only tanente' input a. 
b Sourcet Co"'Pilad fro• the data (21, Appendix Table 3). 
Teble 1 ahowa that more and ~ore labor end capital have been eaao-
ciated with precticelly fi~•d lend •r•• after the •nforcement of the 
progrBDt. i.e., ferNing he• ceen intenaified. Thia ia especially clear 
in tt-. ceae of working c•pitel, attributable mainly to the greet incr•••• 
in fertilizer uaa. Ara th••• pecee of inteneificetion acre rapid than th• 
paat pace? Co•pared, for inetance, with the peek p.riod in Jepeneee 
regime, 1.e., C0111pered with the year• 1935-1939, ••notice that (a) the 
•nnuel increase in labor input during igs0-1956 1• 2 per cent while that 
of 1935-1939 i• o.e par cant end (b) for 11arking capital, the aeme retee 
were nearly 20 per cant versue leae than 2 per cant (21, Appendix Table 3) . 
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c. Impact cf th• Progrcm on Resource Uae 
~Non-tero•t V•riebl .. --
In the previou• aeetione, the il'Mledlate ea well ea ahorter-term 
affect• or the proore~ on income end production increeees have bean die-
oueeed. Ae a whole, the progrem eucceeded in achieving thee• target•. 
Now turning to the lon~er-tarm eff ecte of th program on income and 
Qroduction incteesea one uet, of neceaaity, pey clcae ettention to 
the impact of the pragrti~ on resource u••· Here our d1acuaelon will be 
•xpanded not only rro~ ehorter-term ef fecta to the longer-term affect• 
but elao from • narrower conteMt to a •idar one covering the reletion-
ahip with non-agricultural sectore. That ie, we propoae to analyze the 
coaition or the preeent program in the laMg-term over-ell economic de-
velopment rr•l1l9wark. 
Thia section i• divld•d into two perte. The firet pert i• devoted 
to a brief &ketch or the recent pattern of re•ource use in Taiwan••• 
agrlculttn'•, together with the ecco~penying ellocetive problem•. Then, 
ln the latter p•rt, the erfecte which are probably eloaer to the repercua-
•ion or the program on the reeource uee oroblema will be dlecu•eed. 
Throughout the whole section, the major point or departure ie the optimum 
reaource allocation in the ~hole economy. That i• the raeeon ~• said •• 
w;nuld encounter the over-ell econo~io development framework. We will be 
concerned with the reletianehipe betweeTI the agricultural eactor and the 
non-agricultural sector. 
Another point, which II.ill become obvious aa one proceeds, i• that 
we ere getting into the realm or the ooaeible ehortcominge or the program. 
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1. Pettarn or reeource uae in recent yeera 
Ona of the outatending raeturee or T•i en••• egrerien atructurea i• 
the •><tr••ly small •iz• or holding. Large nu bare of rarme ere too 
81'1t&ll to meat avan the aubaiatence ~1n1mum, not to mention the full 
ut1liz•t1on or the termer•• equipment. 
Tabla 6. a Average alze of ferma in Taiwen , aelected yeara 
Year Size of ferme 
(heoterae) 
Indew (1942•100) 
1942 
19•7 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1.89 
1.51 
1.39 
1.32 
1.24 
1.19 
1.15 
1.12 
1.09 
8
Sourc•• Coiapilad trom the data (6). 
lCO 
ao 
74 
70 
66 
63 
61 
59 
58 
During tha peet t .. nty yeara, •• Table 8 ahowe, the average aiza of 
farm• in Tai an ha• bean ateedily dacliningJ from neerly 2 hectares in 
1942 to •lightly o~•r one hectare in 1961. Th .. • a1zaa era hardly deemed 
large enough for providing full utilization or farmer•' r .. ourcea. ror 
one thing, their labor hes never bean fully utilized, ea •111 be pointed 
out l•t•r· Again, the decline in aize offar-• 1• aeriou• in the aenae 
that technological development, ••P•cielly ~ech•nizetion, uauelly favor• 
larger f•r••· At l •••t, some minimum aize of f•ru 1• a "mu•t" for 
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• echenization. A fairly lerge eize ie "preferable" for aechen1zetton to 
epeed up. 
Are farm• big enou;h to provide • eubei•tence minimum? Obviously 0.5 
hect•r•• eppeer• to be too amell. One etudy carried out in 1957 reveal• 
thet the totel ferm family income earned by far~•r• operating i ... than 0.5 
hectare• 11188 not •ufficient to meet ell their expense• (22, P• 130). A 
rough e•timete 1• thet naerly one heotere (in the ceae of better land, auch 
••paddy land, epproximetely 0.75 heoterea) 1• needed for the term family to 
break even financially (23, p . 1). Regarded from thie eubaietence minimum, 
it eay be ••id to be tortuneta that the everage •iz• of fer~• in Taiwan ia 
atill above that minimum. But the prospect• tor the future appear extramely 
p•••i~i•tic. Should the declining trend continue, it would not be too long 
bef'ol'e the average size of ferme drape into the 11under the minimum•• bracket. 
Although the ave.rage eize of farm• 1• etill above the hminimum" r•-
quired, lltJny fer11S heve long ego aunk into th• belaw-eubaiatence-t11inimum. 
rerniera in thia category have euppl .. anted the1t incomes by 1ome non-farm 
eourcae. 
Table 9. • Cleeeificetion of tarma by eize, selected y•era 
Clea••• 
(ha} 
L•H then 1.0 
l.0-2.0 
2.0- 3. 0 
3.0-5.0 
Above s.o 
Total 
1939 
(Number) (~ ) 
197,730 46 .23 
112,555 25.91 
57,404 13.17 
41, 711 9 . 56 
22,384 5.13 
431 ,784 100 
1949 
(Number) (tf ) 
322,039 56.87 
157,446 27 .81 
54,197 9.57 
25,6~1 4. 53 
6,947 1.22 
566,270 100 
1956 
(Nuinber) (f' ) 
•22,948 56.86 
199,245 26.65 
69,382 9.33 
37,749 5.07 
15,604 2.10 
743,928 100 
1961 
(Number) (~) 
492 ,529 60.99 
195,183 24.17 
65,916 B.16 
315,695 4.54 
17,277 2.14 
807,600 100 
a Sourcet Compiled from tha data (24, p. 10, 25, pp. 12-19, end 26, 
pp. 26-27). 
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Two thing• etand out clearly in Table 9. One 1• that during the 
tlf8nty yaare juet P•••ttd, the number of farm femili•• hea greatly in-
creaead. It hes nearly doubled. This doe• not imply, however, that the 
rerm family hae been divided into smaller howsaholda, aay epprox1metely 
half ea big ae before. Rather, thi• i• e eign or th• daolin• of •i~• ot 
farm• to elmo•t one-half of the ain they were twenty yaars ago. The 
aize of the farm remily remoined almoat the aame es ehown ln Table 10. 
Thue Tabl .. S, 9, nnd 10 put together, cern us (e) how earioua the men-
lend retio he• alrHdy becor.te end further (b) how 1ncraesirgly acut• thle 
problem hes become thrDUQh pesaege or time. Al~o•t the eeme •iza farm 
family operate• SIDaller end smeller ferma. In la•• than e generation, 
the ••ma acreage of land mu•t now support two farm houaeholda, on the 
evar•ge. 
Table 10. e Average •ize of f•rm houeehold in Taiwan 
Year Peraone per term houaehold 
1931•1940 average 
1941-1950 average 
1955 
1960 
6. 6 
6.7 
6.4 
6.8 
a 
Sourca a Con.piled f~om the deta (4, pp. 7-8 and 19, p. 12). 
The other point ia the at .. dy tendency of the eize or farms to 
deer••••• Nctaworthy 1• the 1ncr•••• in the amalleat aiza cl•••, acreege 
l••• than one heetera. rarma in thi• cl••• which •re euppoaedly "too 
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amell~ have been incraesinQ both in number and 1n percentage. The n1J111b9~ 
of fera famili•e in thie cleea hae more than doubled. Percentage wise, 
it hea increased r~om 46 per cent in 1939 to 61 per cant in 1961. On 
th• other hand, larger farms •r• declining, bath in number and in per-
centage. Overall, Table 9 aho~• ue claerly how peeeimiatic the outlook 
is. There ie a eteedy inoreaee in the numbar of euppoaadly "too emell" 
f•rme, the praeance o' tllhich 1• a burden to th• eocietyJ for thi• 1• 
where inafficienoy end poverty originate. Aleo •itnaesed 1• tha at.ady 
decline in the number of larger farms, the presence of which ahould be 
an eeaet to society, for this i• usually lllhere advancement and proaperity 
take place. It ie apparent thet t.ha amall eize or farms ie e vary c~itical 
obatecle to the developl!IW'nt ot agricultut>e end or the economy in gene.el 
in T•iwe..n. Having aucce•d•d in r1111oving unde•irabla ••pacts of tenancy 
•rreng.,.enta in T•i.an, no• it ie time to tackle thi• eiz• or f•r•• 
problem, leat the upwerd trend in income end production be da.p•ned. 
Thia issue •ill be teken up in th• next •ection. 
Size of f•rni• a. we have juat diacuaeed, !a rtt•lly e apeciel type 
ot e>CDraaaion of combination or raeourcee. ror inetenca, emall far~• 
mean an undaaireble man-lend ratio. It meena too many people crowded in 
... 11 eraee, or auper ebundent labt>r combined with •care• land. Therefore, 
•• ptopoaa to look into the supply of lend, population gro.th, and the 
related lebor auoply in agriculture. 
It h .. been pointed out that land ie the limiting rector in Taiweneae 
agriculture. Other raaourcaa muat be geared to thia limiting factor eince 
it• •mount ia, in e practical •en••· relatively fixed. The percentage of 
cultiveted land to the total lend h• • remained 24 par cent (around 
873,000 he . ) ror more then• decade. ~oraover, en incr•••• in culti-
vated land 1• not teaaible . eccordlng to expert•. 
Since land is acarce and rixed, the •mall rarma indicate thet there 
ere heevy popul•tion prea1ur•• end exceee agricultural l abor . 
Teiwen h•• alw•y• experienced e high population dW1eity. It ie re-
ported that there •ere 285 pereone oer 1quera kilo .. tar in Taiwan end 
that thl• wee th• third hi~h••t denaity in the world (27) . •king thinge 
wor•• 1• •n ever fltOre rapidly increeeing population. Annual population 
gr owth in Taiwan h•• been tr1mendoua . Recent etetietic• on th• population 
growth rate indicate it le ai .. ya ebove 3. 0 per c.,t, ueuelly cloee to or 
even exc .. ding 3. 5 ~er cent. ror inetence, annual rete of growth during 
1959- 1961 averaged 3.7 par cant (28, p. 114). In ract, thia hea been one 
of the 1erld'e higha•t rate• or populetion Qrowth . Aa claaa1f'ied by 
Tho11Paon, (29, p. 35) our population trend belong• to the Cl••• II, 
char•ct•riz•d by high birth rate end low daeth rate. In 1960, the live 
birth rate wae 3. 95 per cent while th• death rate wna 0. 69 per cant 
(30, pp. 311 end 314). Ho• to reed (thb relatH to level ot living) end 
to provide work (thia relates to productivity end national inco~e) for 
this already vest and atill rapidly 1noreeaing population ere certainly 
the moat acute challenge• Taiwan ia deatined to face. Thi• i• th• very 
problem that worried ~elthua prof'oundly yeera ago. 
Jn spite of' the econo~1c development t.hat hea taken place in the 
peat one-half century, Taiwan 1• etill heavi ly oriented toward agricul-
ture. The agricultural pcpulatlon hae relll8ined large and atable 
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relet1ve to totel populetion ea shown in Teble 11 . 
Table 11. 
Year 
1910 
1919 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1960 
8 
Iner•••• in tot•l end •Qrioulturel papulatlone 
(Thou•and persons) 
Total Agricultural 
population population 
( A) (8) 
3,299 2,087 
3,715 2,297 
4,679 2 ,534 
6,077 2,984 
7,55• 3,998 
l0t792 5,373 
• Sources (4, p. 7 and 19, p. 12). 
Per centage 
ffi 
63 
62 
54 
49 
53 
50 
Aa • reault Qf thia raletion, rutel T•i11Jen i• now aeriou•ly over-
crowded. This, coupled lrdth the reatriction of acarce lend reaourcee end 
the limited work opportunities outaid• of agriculture, inevitably c~uee 
the underemployment of productive reaourcea in agriculture, although every 
effort i• expanded to utilize the only abundant resource, ferm labor, inore 
fully . Average labor 6aput per heotere ot lend increased rrom 228 ~en.days 
ln 1935-1939 to 281 man-day• in 1952-1956 (21, p. 37). Thia is e 23 per 
cent increase in the diraction or lebor intaneive farming . HolMBver, can-
treated to the above trend ia en opooeing movfil1tent or the ennuel ever•g• 
working daye par ferm worker. Thie decree•ed front 172 man-daye in 1935-
1939 to 164 men-days in 1952-1956 (21, p. 38) , about e 5 per cent decreeea. 
The study made by Huang,. Lun-zu gives e more paaaimietic pictura. According 
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to that atudy (24, p. 25), in 1931-1932 rice oro~ino rer~•r• did utilize 
61.B per cent or their labor but thi• ratio dropped to 46.3 oer cent in 
1950-1951. Tli1• •6. 3 per cent 1• th• average for all rarmera. ror 
tenants alone, Huang report• that thie retta was only 42 .7 per cent. 
It society cannot eucceaatully provide enough job• for th• pooula-
tton, i . e • • if there 1• eerioua unemployment or underemploy•ent or both, 
~•lthue• "•1 .. ry end poverty" ere unevoldable. So we beco~• concerned 
with the key poeitlon or populati°" preaaure in Taiwan . Ita impact ia 
fer reaching. It ••t• the pace for economic development through it• 
influence, both on the atenderd or living end on raeource allocation. 
Indeed, in • country wh•r• population preaeure i• strong, little improv•-
~•nt in the ••terial thing• or life can be generated. Rather, in auch • 
country, econonsic atagna1tion eccoapeniad by "mlaery end poverty" will be 
the MO•t likely outcolt8. Th1tt•forat in moat or the Cl••• II countriea, 
Taiwan for one, it ie the populetion thet muat be checked end adjuated to 
the technology end reaaurc••· 
Of courea, there la enother way to leed the economy to increeaed d•· 
velop11ent. That i• the induatrielization proc•••· Thia will be dealt 
with later on. 
Capit•l, like lend, he• be•n scarce. Haieh end L•• (21, AppandiK 
Table 5) cl•••ifiad capital into two categori••· Chemical fertilizer•, 
aeed, reed and .. teri•l end •i•celleneoua item• compo•• 11r:1rking capital 
tlhereea intereat an cattle, depreciation on hou.•, term improvement and 
'••• ror 1rr1oation and draining service belong to fixed caoital . Th• 
r•latlve pl•c•• of th .. • two categori•• or capital in varioue agricultural 
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input• ere ehown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Percentage Qi•tribution of input cetegoriee in Tei11ene•e 
agriculture 
Working fixed 
Year L•nd eree L•bol' input capitel capital Total 
(~ ) (~ ) (%) (%) ci ) 
1935 51.11 25.24 17.03 6.62 100 
1940 52.95 26.69 15.14 s.22 100 
1945 65.27 26.07 5.06 3.60 100 
1950 53.30 29.56 14.19 2.95 100 
1955 46.96 27.95 21.85 3.2• 100 
e 
Sour.ce1 Co111pilad rrom dete (21, P• 40 and Appendix Teble 5). 
lt ia aaen that cc pared to land end labor, capitol te relatively 
•cerc•. lt campri••• la•a then one-fourth or the totel egr1oultur•l 
inputa in T&i~an. The ecercity 1• etpecielly evident in tha oeaa of 
fixed cepital, lllhich hee naver •••••d•d 10 per cent or total inputs. 
furthermore, in the poet-war period it he• rel'Qainad et about 3 per cait 
or total 1nputa, which ia lase than one-helt of the pre-war level. 
In contraet, 1&.'0rkin; capital feraa sell. It i• becoming more impar-
tent ae een be eean from \~• remarkable inorenee in percentage. 
capital geined predominance among various input• in th• recant year• 
because, aa diacueaed earlier, the program incraeaed tenant.' incOG1e and 
encouraged them to invest it on farma. 
Yet, cepitel, ••poclally fixed capital, 1• relt to be in ahort 
eupply. Three major cauaea for the (fixed) capital shortage are liated here. 
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first, there 1• the unrevoreble pria• ratios the intereet rate of 
bank loan• increeeed by 4.6 t1m•, end one of th• moat important types of 
mrking capitel , tttrtilizer • doubled !n price dur 1ng 1935-1955, stiu••• 
•ao• rates remained practioelly u~changad (21, P• 42). Secondly. due 
to. r equirel'l8nta for tengiblo security, many small rarmera and tenants 
h.eva been denied loans entirely. Con•aQuantly , when eav•rely pre1aad, 
termer• turned to the rural at0n•y lender for a laen bee.ring e uaur1ou• 
r•t• of inter .. t. rinally , r•rmar• traditionally looked upon a loen as 
e con9Lrnpt1on loan. Evan thoea laene lent out es production loana era 
often uead r~ conaU1J1ption purpo••• in reelity .. 
In 8utnmfttion Teiwanasa ogricultura haa bean constructed on limited 
lend reaourc•• and e(ltJal ly inedequete capital on th• one hand, end planU.-
ful, chaep lebor on the other, eo that labor h•e bsen weatrd (under-
employme"t) on tha v9ry amell, poorly equipped re.rma . Thia ilftl)li••~ •• 
•• b•ve ••en earlier, thet th• 1aer-g1nel productivity or land ha• bean ex-
tremely nigh, closely followed by t hat of capital, ~hile thet of labor h•• 
been •~tremely low, probably aquel to rero. At leoet tne opportunity coat 
or labor !a z_aro. Thia in turn explain• ~hy rants end interest rat.a 
111era mo high eAd wegea so low in the ~re-reform years. Unle•• oppor• 
tunitia• are improved, the produotiv• etf1c1•ncy and hence 1nco11111 •ill not 
be inoraeaed. 
2. 11!,Paot of th• Program on r••ource allco•tion 
The everage siz• of ferm• in Telcan h•• been declared ta ba too 
•~•11 end tontinuoualy declining. Will the progte.m accelerate tha 
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declining trend of elz• of rerma or will it ect • e br•k• to the trend? 
The ane .. r le that the pragrtllll ia likely to induce ter•• to divide into 
•~llar orae. Under a aitu•tion•thout rigid control• auch ••era in· 
eluded in th• program, •iz• or rarcna ~111 be fairly flexible. ror although 
tha total area or erebl• lend i• ti~•d· frOlll the individual rarm.r'• point 
of view, aiza or farm• can be changed. Than, there ta •lwaya ao~aone 
wanting to aell or r•nt out fer~• in tha cour•• of family axpaneion end 
cantrectton or dua to occupettonal cheng••· In ahort, without control, 
co•patitiva market conditione prevail end the aiza of rer~o ie rather 
•djuatebla to tha n .. d end capacity or tha individual fer•ar. Not ao 
undwr the progrea. The program axarciaaa auch rigid raetr1ot1on• end con-
trols that tr one ronta out hie rerm, ha doaa. in effect, i .... it to the 
tenant roraver. And since t.,ura right• have b••n ao thoroughly protected, 
no tsnent 110Uld pra•l.l1ll•bly give hie right• e.,.y to aomeona al••· There-
rore, tho•• ter~•r• llho either have greater ability or an •~pending f•lllily 
would rind thameelvea involved in aeaking aaditional land in vein. Thi• 
1• a price paid when the program ~•• choaan. 
Perhepa thie ia en appropriate pleca to point out another raatriction 
which hea to do with the rigidity of the progrem. That la, the qualita-
tive combination or the r .. ourcae would be changed. ~are there no pro-
gree ar thia sort, 1~• · · were the lend market r8gulatad by CDlftpetltiva 
rorcee , then •• expect that the more industrious or more cape bl• fernutra 
would eventually teke over the better rarma. Ho ever, in reality, there 
ia •trlct control ~d p.rotaction for the tenent1. Therefore, firat, the 
coincidence or reao~rcaa of tha ••me quality (capacity) ~ey not be 
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realized. Second, a lazy or low-capacity former cen remain on e farm 
llhereee, ~•r• t.hera e co~pat1tive merket, ha •ould have been long ego 
driven out or that rarm. Under euch canditione, the national product 
1• not up to ite potential level. Thia ia to aey that dapertura from the 
achievable level ••• another price peld in eKchenge for • more equal in-
come diatr1but1on. 
Size of ferme ie the reflection of men-l and ratio. Th• human ele-
Qente, population growth end ogriculturel labor will be taken up next. 
l.'het kind or influence doe~ th• program give to the population gra•th 
and the aupply of agricultural labor? 
riret, conaider the inrpect or th• progrl!ln on egriculturel labor. 
After the progr•• tenant• ere willing to work more, for the program 
easuree thllll the opportunity to reap the fruit• of their labor. Thus 
it 1e nawral to find an incrn•• in lebt>r input . 11".oat of' the incrn•• 
in labor input •ill come from f1111!ly labor, tor temily labor hee been the 
inejor aource or lebor aupply end it hea been undaremploy9d in T•iw•n• 
Civen the rather •in•ll end declining ah• of rar111a 1 thi• 11ovement landa 
to 110re lab0r-int8t'leive farming. To the eMt•nt thet thi• labor intensi-
ficetion le due to ... ploying idle lebor, thereby reducing the underem-
ployment, the progr~m 1• aa!d to •~ke e contribution to r•eourc• u••· 
A• Table 13 1nd1cetea the labor input par unit of lend hee 1ncraeeed 
markedly erter the ar. Noteworthy ere the Juaipa in 1947-1949 end in 
1951-195~. The firat jVlllp in intanalfication hea come primarily rrom 
ttw arrorta expended in th• recovary and rehabll1tetion of agriculture frOfll 
the wer d81Rege. Th• eacond jlallp, of 1951-1953, giving added impetu• to 
Table 13. 
Yeer 
1935-1937 
1940 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
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a 
Inda><e• or egriculturel labor input in Teiwan, 1935-1937• 100 
lnde>C of Indal( of total 
total egricultur•l Index of' labor ineut 
lend ere• wrk•r• to tel per he per wor ker 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
101.9 106.7 105. 6 103.6 99 . 0 
96 .. 6 81.4 79.3 82 . 1 97 . ~ 
98.7 125. l 86. 3 87.• 69 . 0 
102 . ~ 133. 5 115.4 112.6 86. 4 
103.S 133. 8 119. 3 115.J 89. 2 
103. 3 135.J 128 . 4 124.3 95 . 0 
103.4 135.3 126.5 122.4 93 . 5 
e 
Sourcer Comoiled rrom the deta (21, ~ppendix Table 3). 
the previoualy mentioned extenaive rehabilitation ef'f'arte, came troa the 
proorem. Theee forcea h•v• been •trong •nd perauaeive . ~henever one 
consider• the post-ll!lr agricultural develop•ent in Taiwan, the fund11111ental 
role or thee• tore•• ahould be elwaye kept in mind . Indeed , the high 
••rk T~iweneae agriculture hea reached in recant yaere may be attr ibuted 
Jointly to the rehabilitation etrort• and the euccaH of the land reform. 
Yet the•• force• wera not atrong enough to utilize all the eveileble 
labor forces ea cen be ••en i" Tabla 13. In the leat column of Teble 13. 
ror i nstance, ere ehown the lebor input• per worker in recent ye•ra . All 
figure• in thi• column ere lesa then 100 ind!c•ting that lebor utilization 
h•• been leea than in 1935-1937. 
It follawa rram the above diacuaeion that the labor force should be 
encouraged to move to the non-eQriculturel aector, leaving ~ore lend tor 
thoae llho r81ft8in, •nd thua contribute toward more opti~um allocation of 
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raeourcee ea well ea tollf!lrd indu•trializetion. Th•r• ie raeeon to beli•ve 
th•t the progre~ might impair thie movement. For now the t•n•nta' life 
h•• become •••ier. To thet. e•t•nt, they would not consider 111ovin9 ea 
••riouely •1 they wauld if there wer• no progretn auch •• thie. In other 
M:>rda, eoaie of the tenants lllho would have eventually left •Qriculture, 
hed there been no program of this kind, 11111 be found at.ill r911aining on 
the farme. more rarmera then otherwlae IDll•n• heavier population preaaure 
end le•• Job opportunitiea, or it •••n• lftOra severe und•ramploy11ant than 
other•i••· 
The exi•tence or underemployment impli•• that the population incraeae 
outran the Job opoortunitiea. Now •• •r• going to ••e if tha program hea 
accelerated th• pace of population 9rowth. 
The arwwar to the above queation will be affirmative. With the pro• 
gr•• cea• the incr•••• in tenant•' incomaa, the b•ttarment in their level 
or living. Th•••• •1th eimulteneoua intprov8Jllanta in aenitary condition• 
end medical care, are among the cajor rector• that ceuaed the rapid popu-
lation growth in r•cant y9'lra. 
Table l• raconrirme our earlier at•t•~•nt concerning the population 
growth in T•illll!ln. It •ho .. cl .. rly that the groea birth rate• liere ex-
ceptionally high, the groaa death rate• quit• lo~ end declining. Ae a 
r••ult. the natural growth retae era hiQh in the peat rirteen yeere. 
A.ang the gro•• birth rat•• end daeth rate• the program tUOuld moat 
directly exarciae ite influence on the letter. Now, after the program, 
tananta• inco199 increaaad, their level of living bettered. They became 
healthier, childhood 8'0rtal1ty dacreeeed, th• life apen langthen•d. The•• 
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Teble 14. Birth end death rate• in Teiwreneee population • 
Veer Croae birth rate Cross death rate tlatural growth rate 
(~) (~) (~) 
1947 3.83 1.81 2.02 
1948 J.97 1.43 2.54 
1949 4.24 1.31 2.93 
1950 4.33 1.15 3.18 
1951 s.oo l . 16 3.84 
1952 4.66 0.99 3.67 
1955 4.53 0.86 J.67 
1958 4.17 0.76 3.41 
1961 3.83 0.61 3.16 
e Source a Figura• f'or 1947-1952 (3, pp. 10 and 14). 
figure• f'or 1955-1961 (28. pp. 477 end 525) . 
ell co~bine to pull da~n the gro•• death rate and thua puah up the 
natural grQ•th rate. althua anticipeted thi• effect IMhen he warned ua 
thet the ma!'1t increaae in the 11eene of livi~ .ould •••ily lead to an 
increeae in population to sueh en extent that eventually the bare aubeiet-
enca level of' living will again prevail . 
The weatern world need not ba ae f'aarf'ul of' ~elthuaian oopuletion 
pressure, but in the underdeveloped countr1 .. , like China end India, 
the malthuaien theory or population atill prove• to be valid in many 
c••as. Taiwan ia hardly a" exception. Thua . the immlldieta incr•a•• in 
the level or living the tenant• have enjoyed after the progrem, iaey have 
given wey ta population preaaure. The elraedy over-crowded rural •reaa 
of Tai .. n ahall h•v• more children to feed end more old men to support, 
each of them having but e minimum amount of' f'ood to keep their atomache 
from being co~pletely empty . Thi• 1• to say thet ¥~1le one or the major 
go•l• or the program 1• to 1Mprova the level of living of tenenta, thie 
is only poesibla in the ehort-run. In th• long-run, due to the increase 
in oopulation brought ebout by the incre••e in income. eooner or l•t•r, 
the per cepite income ahell be pushed down again and the over-ell level 
of living ehall com• b•ok to the lauie:r level unleee there occur• eome con-
eidereble expeneicn of job opportunitie• end technological edvencement. 
1lia program. by treneferring the income from the landlords ta the tenertta, 
h~e certainly l88eened the poverty ~roblem but it failed to remove tho 
daeoar root• of the poverty. Th• population pressure, resource malalloca-
tion and easocieted inefficiency, all have been left for further solution•. 
Thua the effect of the progrent on the lebor reeource (including popu· 
letion) may be eumrned up ee followe. T~e program caused improv•ment by 
encoureglng the t•nante to prectlca more lebor-inteneive farming. but it 
had also offeetting arracta. It Ute oertly re1ponaible tor the rapid 
population gro•th. It tended to ateka farm laborle•• 1At>bila than ottierwiea. 
~· have •••n that the population pre••uree have become mOl'a ecuta 
•nd ••rioua efter tha progr••· t 11auld be their influence on tha aver-
ell cepitel formation, agricultural mecheniz•t1on, industrialization~ and 
economic development in Tai•en? 
In old, denaaly-populeted countt'laa like Taiwatt, the large population 
ha• bean • burden to the society. People muet b• fed end the large popu-
lation requirae tremendous emounta of food. Tharefon, it ie not eurpria-
ing thet in these countriee prectically ell production hae been of nae••· 
aitiaa, leaving little oep•city, if any, for the production of eapitel 
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goods. In other wort1s, peopl• in th••• countriae ere forced to live from 
•hend to 1110Uthw end saving 1• generelly difficult end therefor• amell . 
Without saving, cepital formation ia 1mpo••ible. And cepitel formstion 
ia, in effect, a proceea of induetr1alizet1on end agricultural mechaniza-
tion. It will elso contribute to the technological advancenutnt of aor i -
cUlture by providing more or the cheeD•r cheinic•l fertilizer•, insecti-
cide•, end the like. No saving• mean.a none or th•••· Instead, one will 
rind e stagnant economy with e low level or living end rather backward 
agriculture. One added obetacl• ceuaed by over-population end underem-
ployment i• that the lo• wage r•t• pr•vailing in the aociety "'8k .. agri -
cultural mechanization more difficult to il'Wtigete. However, thll low 
llBga rate may also heve e counter-influence. It •ill lllllk• induetrieliza-
tion •••i•r bacouse cheop labor meena low coat, though caoitel and job 
opportuniti•• in the ncn-egriculturel aector •r• the pr•requlait ... 
The illpact of oooulation growth •ith it• reaultant underamploy .. nt 
on the economic d•v•lopment (i.e., increase in real income) i• even more 
crucial . Tinbargen (2, p. l•) aatimetaa thet in the ehort-run, • 3 
D•r cent increase 1n par capita income in e year 1110uld be the med11U11 
attainable. If thia rate ia eat ea • target than it is necaaaery that 
2 to 4 (X • J) per cant of the national inco•• be aavad and !nveated 
wher e X atenda for annual population Qrowth reta. Applied to the caaa tn 
Taiwan, or other Asian countri .. for thi• saett•r, thi• would account for 
about 12 to 20 pa cant of the national tncoina . To astc a country to 
••v• end invaat 12 to 20 par cant or the n~tionel income ie extr .. ely 
diff icult if not altogether impoeaible. Indeed, T1nb9rgen observe• that 
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"(it h) ... 11 above whet hee eo fer bean poeeible" (2, p. l•). The 
numerical relationship given above illuatratae, lllCra eloquently then 
11ards, th• importance of e check o" the inor88se in population. Any 
reduction in the parcentega population increase eena e two to four-fold 
reduction in the reta or aeving needed to achieve a given riee in the 
atenderd or living (2, p. 15). 
Now let ue turn to the impact of the program on tha supply or capital 
in the agricultural •actor . 
On the credit aide ~• may note the repid incre••e in th• capital 
input, ••peci•lly working c•pital, in recent years. The marked inoreeae 
in the relative weight of the working capital emong the resources hea 
been pointed out earlier (Table 12). There it is ehown that working 
capital was the only resource th•t definitely gained relative weight. 
Table 15. 
Veer 
1935-1937 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1953 
1955 
a Indax•e or cepitel inveat~ent in Tei11an, 1935-1937=100 
Index of Index of lnde)( of 
110rking cepital ti xed ca pi tel total inputa 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
93.99 109.55 98.64 
83.51 86.49 98.60 
21.47 45.91 75.85 
43.98 29.33 81.71 
57.90 51.85 94.66 
88 .35 49.43 101.50 
115.24 57 .94 109.02 
137.83 61.37 112.79 
a Source a (21 , Appendix Teble 3), 
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Table 15 indicataa the yenrly change of cepital invaetment in agri-
cul tura. It ia aean that working cepitel 1• vary sensitive to economic 
chang••· Jt fluctuates widely. Comp11tiaon of the change• in working 
capital end total input• further reveal thl!lt t"- eupply of M>rking 
capital recovered fro• the •Dr late, but prograaaad rapidly. Before 1950, 
it waa atill tar behind, in 1950 end thereafter, however, it ce• to lnd 
other inpute end •ithin five yeera or ao it increeaed by 11\0re then 100 
per cent. Such a tr1tmandoua increeae might have happened without the 
program, tor the period covered ie characterized by recovery end rehabilita-
tion and aquelly atrang further development nt0vementa. Vat it ie quite 
concelvebl• that the proorem geve added impetus to it. 
Th• program could give added impetus to it baceuee th• moat aigni-
ficent 1t8'1!1 ot the working capital hee been tha fertilizer end it we• the 
fertilizer that the Teiwenaae termer• relied heavily upon for their ~re­
duction increase. £erl1•r ~• have seen thet the progrem brought ebout a 
atrongar incentive to produce QlOre among tenenta. • have elao •••n that 
thia, in turn, raaultad in more lebor-lnteneiva farming. However, H ie 
not the •imple labor-intenaiv• forming thet actually took place but e 
combined ceae ot 1ntenaification, lebor-intanaiv• with cepitel-int anaive 
farming . New methods ot farming, mainly improved biolo9icel teehnin•Jaa, 
have been oontinuouely introduced into agriculture. Th .. • new -•Y• or 
terming usually require more of both inpute, lebor and 1110rkin9 capital, 
auch •• 1aproved •••d• , ch9C111cel fertili?era, ineecticidee, etc. The 
result eppaera in Tabla 16. As i• evident fro= Table 16, both the caoi-
tal intaneity (in e precticel aanae, 11ark1ng cepitel) and the labor 
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intenaity heve incraaaed but the increeae is greeter in the form•r then 
in the letter. 
a 
Table 16. Changes of capital and labor intensities in Taiwan 
Year 
1935- 1937 
1953 
1955 
Capital intensity 
100 
127 
150 
Labor intensity 
100 
124 
122 
8
Sources Compiled rrom the date (21, p. 58 and Appendix Tabla 3). 
The effect of the program on fixed capital pointa to the opposite 
direction {Table 15). fixed capital input haa elweye lagged behindt 
(e) rixed capital ie the only input thet 1• still ahort of the 1935-1937 
level. In 1955 it ~a• only 61 per cent of the be•• period. Lend , labor, 
end •orking capital, in contrast, have all long ego surpassed the b~ee 
period. Thia la shown in Tablas 13 and 15, (b) Percentage wiaa, fixed 
capital i• the lee•t important among th• varioua inputs end its relative 
aignificance during the pest twenty yeera has declined to half of that 
held in 1935 •• ehown in Table 12. 
The reeaon for this low level of fixed capit al mey be traced beck 
to the landlord•' reaction to the program. Before the initiation of the 
program, aome landlords ehowed kean intereat in production improvement. 
They took reeponaibility for end actually financed the fixed capital inve•t-
ment (sometimes, part of the •orking capital, too), euch ea conetruotion 
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of irrigation end drainage fec1lit1ee, terracing, soil 1mprovemant1 
•ometima• alone, •o times cooperating with the government. Indeed, the 
development of the irrigation and dreinege eyatem chich ia the roundetlon 
or the modern agriculture in Teiwon owed much to th• l~ndlorda for their 
cooperative wrke on the coNtruction end maintenance of irrigation end 
drainage eyatema. However, oft.er the progre rwithar their interest in 
land nor their activity in ti~ad capital investment survived, because 
their ehera or the product rrom the lend haa been cut end fixed. The 
•ignificance of landlord•' rola in thi• respect may ba vieuelized from 
the ~id• divergence of the fixed capital investaiant between 1935 end 1955 
(Refer to Table 15). 
Are either tenants or the government not nbl• to teke over the job 
previously done by the lendlords? Although t•nenta' income 1noree••d. it 
irould •till be too much to expect the~ to taake e fixed capital inve•tment. 
Their level of living urgently needed betterment. On th• production side, 
the 110rking capital such •• ch.inic•l rert111zera end paeticidaa waa rt ret 
in lin• to dra11 their money. There is simply no •~tre money available 
for ti>ead cepitel investment. 
The government has ita own rinencial difficulty, too. Unlike ita 
predecessor, the Jepanaee government 11hich during it• occupation of Ta1111an 
anjoyad a sizebl• public revenue ovary yaer, the preaent government ha• 
been involved in 'innnciel difficulty. Tharerore the present goverrwent 
cannot •fford to conduct •• many larga-ec•le projects in quick eucceasion 
•• the Jepeneee government did. 
Although the lo l•v•l or fixed c~p!tel inputs ~8Y not manI'••t 
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it•elf in the ahorter-run, certainly the lack of theoi will be '•lt in 
the future . It ia anticipated that thi• will become en obatecle t.o 
long-run egricultu~al d•velopmant in Taiwan. 
We have learned that population growth handicapped the over-•11 
capital formation in the economy. Through tha landlords' reaction to 
the progrem, the over-all capital for~ation will be further elolftld down. 
Genarelly epeaking, th• larger part of the •ociety'a saving• com•• from 
the .. elthier cl•••· Jepan provides en appropriate exemple. ~uch of 
the capital needed for ita indu•tr i aliz•tion, along the course of ita 
weaternizetion, ceme frOCJt the agrloultural aector. fr!ore epecificelly it 
came from the landed property (21, pp. 242-245) . The lendlorde were ona 
or the central figure• in the capital eupply. The capital originated on 
land, accumulated by the landlord•, w•• than tranaferred ta the induetriel 
center• and turned into machine• and the like to proamta t.he induatriali-
zation proc•••· Nearly e cantui-y a required for Japane•• landlord• to 
fulfill their hletoricel duty. Teiwenaea lendlorda hed performed the 
••me kind of teak but poaaibly to s l••••r degree. ~fter the progr._, 
with the drain of their income from the lend, the trenaformation of any 
eurplu• from agriculture into lh• induatrial cepital inveatmant hee elao 
declined . As the Jepen••• ceaa illuatretae clearly, in the early at•Q• 
or economic development, 1nduetr1el1zet1on may be fad by the •urplu• fro~ 
the •Qricultur• (J2, pp. ~11-612). Thi• •urplua hed never been aizable 
in Te1wen, end with the redietributlon of income eccompli•h•d by the 
~rogr8'1 it haa becOGe •••ller. It i• hoped that rapid advenc.,..nt in 
technology will increaae the production ao rapidly thet it ~ey eventually 
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match end even exceed the amount of eurplue provided in the pre-reform 
deye. 
Aleo the leek ot anterpreneurehip hea been felt keenly etter the 
program. In the peet, many lendlorde perticipetad in rarming both in 
planning end admin1atret1on. People ehould realize thet in an under-
developed country euch es Taiwan, tenenta or farmer• ere ganer•lly 
poorly equipped tor the role or enterpreneur or mftf\Ogar. The role played 
by the landlords in thie regard ia too orten overlooked. Schumpater 
eingled out ~innovet1onu ea t~• b••io chareoterietic of anterpreneurehip, 
end profit, the reward to aucceeatul "innovntionn. 
That economic davelopnaent depend• heavily on innovation ie too 
obvioua to be etraaaed. Vat innovation raquir .. adue1't1on and experience . 
The level or education received by the tenant• and that by the lendlords 
we• in e aherp contraat. Jt 1• ••f• to say none of the tenant• waa 
colle;e-educated shereae many landlords were college graduate• and were 
in re•pecteble positions. At tho other extreme, many tencnt• (fermere) 
were illiterate which was in eherp contrast to the high literacy among 
the lendlorda. 
O. rurther Stepe Suggeated 
In the preceding eection it wea found that the program tend• (e) to 
accelerate the population growth, (b) to c•u•• agricultural labor to be 
1110re tightly tied to the land. (c) to retard the fixed oepitel 1nve•t•8f'lt, 
and (d) to cauee a decline in enterpreneurehip. All of theae probl91'11• 
~u•t be aolved. fu~ther atepa, timely and in sufficient acale, are 
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•trongly •uggeated, for failure to do ao may •v•ntu•lly cauea the 
echlev.,..nts of th• progre to be ahort-liv•d. 
l. Population check• 
The population problem i• a most critical and difficult problem. 
A viciau• circle among th• population praaaur•, poverty, saving, capital 
formation, induetrializetion and agricultural machonizetion, underem-
ployment, and finally th• backw•rdn••• in the economy haa bean demonstrated 
earlier. It is •••n, than, no one policy, being income diatribution 
orl•nted or resource allocation oriented, cen hardly achieve en •ndur1ng 
succeaa in the t'•c• of th• h•avy population preaaure. Population is eo 
crucial e rector that every effort muat be •~ercisad to check th• popula-
tion growth without d•ley. It i• e pity that only •ffactive meeaura 
hsra ia education , birth control, re~ily planning, etc. This 1•, of 
neceaeity, a long-term projeet. The fact that it require• time, ho .. v•r• 
ahould not dl acour•g• peopl• from taking en active rol• in proraoting such 
an education. The fe~ily plarY1ing pro9rera was launch•d in Taiuian in 
1956. The affect so fer 11 n~ligible (3J, p. 36•) becauea thia program 
he• never been pushed •• atrongly es it ahould be, due to the conflict 
bet•••n th1• goal and the political as well ea military goals. 
2. Technolog!cel edvenoement in agriculture 
Cloaely related to the population problem 1• the a•c•••ive lebor 
aupply with ite reaultant underemployment problem in agriculture. There 
•re tso approach•• to thia problem. Th• t'iret approach is the development 
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in •oriculturel production technique end ferm orgenizetion hich make 
fuller uee of the agricultural labor possible. However, the proepect 
here 1• rather dismal, owing to the highly labor-inten•ive farming 
already in axietenee. At leaat potentiality in th1• route will be 
di•lniahint) in ttta future. In the future, ~•r• labor-intensive methods 
ere unlikely to be developed. Instead, development in science euch •• 
biolooic•l improvements or edvancementa in equipment will receive more 
~heaia . In particular, effort will be directed to the kind of tachnolooi-
c~l edvencamenta that meke labor •• well •• capital intanaificetion po•· 
aible in agriculture. 
3 . lnduatrielizetlon 
The aecond epproech ie tha procaaa of induatrielizetion. Indeed. 
agricultur• hes dominated Teiwena•• economy to too graat an extent. 
Oivareification of the national ecano•y through induatrial development i• 
long overdue. Induetrlalizetlon may take many fortraa. One that •ult• 
the underdeveloped country •1th it• already over-crowded rurel cotM1unity 
i• the •a-celled cott•g• or village indu•triee (3•, pp. 84-87). They IABY 
be th• fairly lerge-acele, heavily mechanized type, like auger fector1•• 
or textile• mills found in rural Teiltfl.n. Or they ~•y take the form of 
emell-ecele, mainly handicraft plant•. In eny case, the type of industry 
that •baorb• inore or the idle •griculturel labor , yet require• a •mell 
e1110unt of C1tpital to establish, la much to be preferred. Th• extant to 
llh1ch labor can be ebsorbed 'ram e~ riculture into industry will b6 vital 
because it 111111 determine the e>etert to which productivity cen be raie.d 
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in the economy (35, p. 1337). As part or the excess labor supply le 
drawn orr the lend m1th the proorees of industrialization. the produc-
tivity end tha value of labor in egriculture will rise . Thia rise in 
veluo of egriculturel labor will, in turn, promote ogriculturel meoha"ize-
tion. With the uae of improved •oriculturel equipment better farm 
practicea cen ba introduced end the result will be clJmul&tiva. Th• 
above argument emply emphasize• the key role of industrialization in the 
devel opment of agriculture (35, p. 1335). 
A. Correction of the unfevoreble erica etructura 
One of the factor• that berred capitol in-flow to agriculture hes 
baen t he unfavorabl e pries atructura tor the farmer• . Thie ieeue 111es 
touched upon when we diecueeed the affects of the inflationary preeeuree 
end price atebilizetion policy of the government. There it wee pointed 
out that the prices of egriculturel product• have baen atriotly controlled , 
•o thet the prices termer• received tended to lag behind the price• far-
mer• h•d to pay . This meane that pricaa or fertilizera, cement, etc., 
hnve beccmie relatively high. Thia unfavorable price atructure carteinly 
meda it difficult for fer~•r• to underteka capital investment . It i• the 
raletively high price of producer•' gooda, euch ea fertilizer, end high 
interest retae on the one hand, end the low value of the agricul tural 
labor on the other thet aerve to handicap the capital inveetment in egri-
cul tur e . In thie vain, one way of encouraging cepitel investment lies 
in price incentives . Hera •o•in induetrielizatJ.on playe a vitel pert. 
Indus t rialization will •b•orb exceea labor in rurel areaa . It will al90 
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incr•••• th• eupply or end hone• pull down the price or producer•' gooda 
n .. ded for bettar rar~ing. All thaee ltill bring the raeourc• allocation 
nearer to the optimum. ~eanwhile the productivity of reecurcea will b• 
incraaeed. 
Ae another means cf correctin9 the unfavorable price structure, the 
government 111t1y be Baked to eubaidize the producers' goods induatry, ea 
well •• to improve the marketing or thaee goods eo that fermar• Mey obtain 
them at tha chaepeet poaaibl• price. Even government participation in 
either production or marketing (includino i porting) or producers• QODda 
y be auggeated. 
5. Aorioultural credit imp&OV•l'f\!nt 
In view of the greater and oraeter capital raQuired for 1110dern, 
advanced terming, it is eeeentiel that a tltloleaOtfta agricultural credit 
eyatem be eatabliehed to provide capital for fermere at reeaoneble terms. 
Ae fer ea the credit eyatem i• concerned, Taiiaen he• several credit 
inetitutee engaged in the agricultural finance bueineee. The only diffi-
culty i• that their lending ectiviti•• have to be severely re•trictad 
due to the drain of loanable funda. e a r•ault, (e) precticelly no long• 
tarui loene hav• been available to tarmera, (b) to get a loan troM the 
credit inatitutea hea baen difficult, and eV11n if one auccaaded in getting 
one the a110unt i• uaually too 811811. In the c••• ot tenenta, thi• ia 
eapacially true beceuae of the general cuato• of raQuiremanta tor tangible 
eecurity. 
Since egriculturel credit 1• specific and handicapped compared to 
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the credit in other aectora of the economy, the teak or improving the 
present inadequate cradit eyatem muat fall on the govarnnent. Firat. only 
the government can collect lerga •lD• or money to be used to make the 
egr1cultur•1 loana . Thie ia eapecielly •o becauae the domestic eevlnga 
ere rather •~•ll and th• major aource or the loermble funde rnuat calla 
fro~ foreign countr1ea. Thia 1• especially ao, elao, beceuee only the 
governAlent cBn go into buaineea wl thout makir-.;J a prorit, even bearing 
some lo•••• if necaaaery. 
In view or the limited fund• available for •or1cultur•l lo•na, the 
efficiency or loan• 111Culd presumably be incraaaad ware there only one 
inatitute rather than many •• at praaant. In other word•, it 1• etrongly 
•UQ988tad that th••• inetitutea be merged into one end all the runda be 
pooled togathe~. 
Farmar• ere also reaponaible for the ehort•g• or agricultural capi-
tal eupply. It la obaarved th•t rermera do not yet appreciate the nature 
and benefit or the production loans . Aleo, loans mada ror production ore 
often used for com1u111ption purposes. for thel'll, borrowing haa been the 
leet resort. and haa been done treditiomally ea a con.umptlon loen. Thia 
trend helped the riae of the uaurere end the abueea a>nnected •ith them 
(8, pp. 36-39). To remedy the miauee of the loans. oloealy auperviead 
loana •ey be an effective device. Tha euparvised loena ere really a 
multi-purpoee activity . In addition to the original function of supplying 
capital, thi• activity alao provide• infol'11at1on end knowledge concerning 
efficient organization and edv•ncad technique• to the fer~era. Cenerel 
education. in pertieuler knowledge about the nature of loans, aignificence 
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or th• bookkeeping, etc., will oleo greatly reciliteta meking the loane. 
6. Gover nment'• direct 1nve&tment 
Besides providing loans to the termere under favorable term• the 
government 1• elao encoureged to c•rry out soma large-scale project• like 
conetr uction of dems end irrigetion ayatema1 tor farmers will never 
initiate, nor cen they ~rrord, such a ve1t investment by thamal•v••· The 
government in the underdeveloped countriea ie thus el111aya in e dilemma . 
It happens that it ia in th••• poor countriaa that th• government i• eleo 
poor, although the maed for government aid ie urgent end tremendoua . In 
this r•apect, th• development ot international cooperative credit tecili-
tie• like the World Senk 1• aegerty aought. 
Government pert1c1peti on in th• rield or agricultural cepitel aupply 
ia not limite.d to loana end ptojecta directly C1lntr1but.ing to agricultural 
production. The government m&y be equally qualified to invaei on coramunel 
racilitiee and aer~icea auch ae road•, achoole , ~•dice! care, electricity, 
runni~ water, end preventive medicine. These ere social inveat1J1Gnt• 
because they narro• the gao bet111Ben urban lire end rural life. Th••• are 
economic 1nveetmenta aleo beceuee they fecilitete economic activities and 
meke termer• better equipped. 
7. (ducetion end extana1on 
So •• come to deal with enterpreneurship. Like population adjuet-
~•nt , the only eftectiva measure in thi• r••pact i• education. £ducetion 
ie uaed her& in it• broadest sense. I t include• vocet1on~l training aa 
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well ae general education, and also th• extension •srvicas. Pr.Sently 
• six-yeer grad• achoo! education is provided to averyon• et no ~o•t . 
However, in v1•w of the recant rapidly advancing production techniques, 
whet the grade achocle cen give ia too limited to equip one to hand.le 
the modern for m bt.Jainass auccesefully . There is l!SlaO a tendency tor 
secondary and higher level schools to concan,reta in ur ban araea. To 
m8ka higher education accessible to evaryon• in the nation should be the 
goal hers. No l••s important are the short coui-sea in off-fer,. job 
treining to halp farmers moving out of fnrma. 
Naxt, coming to extension services, llthet t he •idaspraad extension 
efforts eould ecco.mplleh hea bee" cleerly demonstrated in the United 
Stotea. Indeed, it i• hard to conceive an effective tenoncy i11provement 
measure uhich is not intagratad •1th education end arlenaion nct1vitiaa 
(8, pp . 47-48). moreover, ea the verious aactors or the aconomy b•com• 
mutu~lly mars cloeely interrelated, information services concerning new 
agricultural meteriele, equipment and techniquue, job opportunities out-
eide cf egricultura, gen.-r·al outlook• r1'r pricea and metrket•, etc . , •till 
bec0111e more important. 
8 . Increase 1" the eupplx of lend end improvement in lend utilization 
tt wae point•d cut that ai~• of ferme in T iwan is too amall. Since 
sire or fe~m• i• the result of the men-land ratio, the inereeae in the 
aupply of land 1111ght increase the size of farina, too. Supply ot lend 
hae tllO llleeninge, physical and ecann111ic:. 
Phyelcel supply or lend ia rather fixed although it i• still poesible 
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for it to bo expanded. ror a~e le, the government hea b••n engaged in 
the reclamation of tidal lend. The reeaibility or converting roreat 
lond in the ~untainoua area into ereble land 1 now undor 1napection. 
Howevsr, not much incraaee could be aMpected from either measure. In 
contTeet, it ie certain thet aoma or the preeent cultivated lend will be 
converted into non-agricultural ueee as induetri•lizeticn proceeds. The 
net reeult would ba for the cultivated land to decline slowly o~, et ba•t, 
to remain at the current level. 
r conomic eupply or land ie rather flexible, end it• extrene1on 
fairly hopeful. Ccon:>~ic eupply of land will inoraeea &hanever technolo-
gical end biologicel innovations take place. Theae innovatione, unlike 
the phyelcel aupply of lend, do not require moru lend. All they do ie to 
imorove the lend ut111z•t1on. Again. since thaea innovetiona aeem to b• 
limitl .. e, the i•provement ot l•nd ut111zetion seems to ba poaeibla. 
9. Conaolidetian or holding• end oravention ot eeomentation 
One aarioua drawback r•l•ted to the emall terma i• the cuatom or 
dividing the elra•dy S1118ll rara holdings equally amen; the me.la heire . 
ln thie way, not only do th• holdinge become eaeller, but the num~r or 
plot• thet canpriaa the individual holding tend to inc:reeae. Th••• 
tendenciea bring about (•) waete or lend, (b) weete or labor hour• end 
(c) inatficiant terming Dr•ctioe. Either the cuato~ has to be modified 
or the land consolidation ll<>vemant mu.t be pushed forward. Japanea• 
experience on the latter ehowa that the coneolidetion would result in en 
1ncreeaa or ten to fifteen per cent or the erebl• lend end • twenty 
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p•r c•nt labor aeving (36. p. 135). 
10. R•eeer ch needs 
Inasmuch ea the atepa euggeetad above ere ell fund~mentel to the 
progr am under study, aome furthar reeeerch 1• equally atrongly needed. 
Thi• ie ao bec•u•• unlaee one haa gathered enough empirical data to aup-
port hie theoretical re.aaoning one cannot •sleet a correct, moat efficient 
etep to edopt . 
Too little haa eo far been known atout the organization of rerm1 
end hence the raeource productivity in Teh:enaae agriculture. Lllithout 
thia b••ic knowle~g• one cennot get very tar !n hie en11lyaie . Prodlotion 
economics research 1• urgently needed to provide generel background in-
forntetion upon the baa!• of w.hich varioue policy recommendatione cen be 
•ade. for inst•nce, a theoretical be•i• for corapeneetion tor the inva1t-
•ent or i•pt'ova•ant made on th• feraa can be .ark•d out only if •• have 
enough intol'ftlet1on about the arQinel return product ot the 1nveatm•nt 
n.ede by th• tenente . 
A• we have aean, the program muat have exerciaed so~a effects on 
the resource allocation. Ju•t in ~hat cey end to lllhet extent he1 the 
proorea epecifically chengad tf'ul pattern at reeou~c• ellocetion in 
Teiwanase agriculture? hat have been the eimilar effects on produc-
tivity? Thasa queatiana can be en•••r•d only after further reeeerch h•• 
bean done. 
Sevinga and capital foratation determine th• pace or economic gro•th. 
• don't know much about tha aavinga end ceolt•l formation in the pre- refor• 
deya. 
either . 
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e don't kno~ much ebcut the program'• effects on these points 
Co•p•riaon batw .. n the landlords end the tenenta concerning the 
potential ea well ea the actual aevinge end agricultural investment hee 
not yet been available. Until w• have colleetad ell thi• date, ~• cannot 
reach any final conolueion about the "net~ effect of the program on the 
capital investment in agriculture end the capital formation in the 
Teill8neaa economy ee • llhole. 
Size of ferm• is anothar field towerd hich further r••••rch muat 
be directed. Secauae of the ateedy decreeaa in a!za of farm•, research 
on (•) rel at i onship b•t•aen sire or r rm• varaua efficiency and •iz• or 
far~• veraus minimum level or livi"g and (b) ceuesa of bret2king the 
fer~a into smaller farms and tha efficient aeaures to prevent further 
break down, era emong the more important paint• to be etudied. 
Related to thi• ie the reee•rch on population growth . E•p•cielly 
needed l• e comperative study on th• nature of rural versua urban popu• 
lation gro~th. Studies on labor eupply end employment eituetiana ere 
also vary much in need. 
Agricultural markets and marketing have not bean studied. f.gricul-
ture i• but one eector er the whole ocono~y. ~odern ferming i• a buein••• • 
Reeeerch on •~pension of the tnt!lrkete ea wall ae 1mprovenient in marketing 
muat not be neglected . Since Talwen ia e amell ielend, international t~ede 
ehould ettrect more end more ettentlon here. 
~any or theae problems era not peculiar to Te11J8n. Other densely 
populated countri•• rece •imiler problem• end may possibly have worked 
out the •elution•. Therefore, it le of advantage to ell that information 
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conc:•~ning tha currant i-eeearch projecte, ea well _,. p~et find!nga ha 
int•rcM•ng•d ~at'Ween thaee countries. 
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VI. SU .ARY ANO CONO..USIONS 
Th• Tai•aneee r•nt limitation program or 19~9 •ae en epoch-making 
program upon who•• auccea• later development policies end the reaultent 
economic growth •ere ~eda poaeibla. 
Prior to the p~oorem, one of the striking feature• of the agrarian 
etructure in Teilll!ln ••• the ~ide-epreed tenancy eystam with cany ebu••• 
exarc!aed by the lendlorda. Ten•nte lived under the preeaur•• of ex-
orbitant rent and 1neecure tenure. Incentive•• technical knowledge, end 
capital all were lacking in tenants• fer11ing. Inatead, the econo~ic 
etegnation end the social unreet remained. A releaee or tenant• frOll 
"poverty end inefficiency" wee the prerequieite to ttw economic progr••• 
of Taiwan. 
It ie then natural that the over-ell goal• or the progre~ ••re ••t 
on a more equal income distribution and production increaae. Within the 
context of the•• two meeter goale, the program offered the following 
specific targets ea the ends-in-vi••· They area (•) to increaae tenant•' 
ehare of inC01ft8 by 12.5 par cent of the total yield, (b) to guerentaa 
trn.m with e mini•wn leval of living not interrupted by the natural die-
aaters, (c) to increaee the egriculturel prociJction, (d) to provide them 
with security or tenure end finally (e) to eetebliah human independence 
conducive to the development or e progreaeive end democratic society. 
The program ae e remedial nteeaura centered •round the rant limita-
tion ond tho protection of tenure rights. lt tried to bring the tenure 
eepect of the egrerien etructur•• more in line with •Guel incoine dietributian 
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•••• 11 as arr1ciant farming. \I/hat the progrem •ccompliahed 11111• th• 
atructural chenge. Thia etructur-el change , in turn, inevitably caueed 
aome change• in instrumental veriablee, eepeoially the chengee in re-
eaurce uee. 
Although increaeae in the tenenta' income end in egriculturel pro-
duction ware observed, there i• reeeon to believe that th••• may be 
ehort-run phenomena. In the long-run, due to ch•"9•s in reaource uwe, 
it will become more and ~re difficult for the progrem to maintain the 
eccoaipliehnlent it ha• ac~ieved in the ahort-run. 
Indeed, efter the impalmantetion of tha progrem, reaourc• uae hea 
further diverged from the optimum. rtrat, me have pointed out that the 
alreedy heavy pcpuletion pressure tende to etrengthen it• effect aa the 
progr•m tenda to pull dcum the death rete throuQh increase• in income 
•nd l•v•l or living. Lo.var deeth rates eccompaniad by high birth retee 
mean a higher populetian gro~th rate. Thia, in turn, will pull down the 
level ot living to the aubaiatence level. Here 119 heva the ~elthueien 
peeeimiam revived in rurel Taiwan. 
Although th• population problem le eavare, no lees critical ie the 
axcesa lebor supply in agriculture. (xceee labor supply end the conee-
quent undaramploymant hove long bean the core of resource malellocetion 
problem•. The program tend• ta ret.erd the movement of the labor force 
any from hrms becouaa or its aff'ects on income end living. Thie will 
not only woraen the resource allocation 1n agriculture, it will elao 
slow do.n the pace or 1nduatriel1zet1on end mechanization. 
Arable lend in Taiwan 1• preeticelly fixed. Therefore, the 
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ever- growing population pr•••ure •• well a• th• auper abundant egricultur•l 
labor supply 11111tana amell aize of holdings. The elr&edy too SIQ8ll farm• 
have b•come even amaller after the progre~ . r•r• •ize 1• nou smeller 
than that required for eff1o1ant farming end thraetena to dacraeae belo• 
the level required to maintain •inimUlll living etandarda . 
Although the prograaa h•• encouraged the inveetment of 1110rkln9 capital, 
tixed capital inV11•t•ent hae dllClinad fro~ the pre-refcl't8 level . Decline 
in the fixed capital originated ttom two eourcea . riret, in the peat, •• 
in Japan. Teiwan .. e landlord• participated end took the •nin reaponai-
bili ty in providing t.ha fixed capital in egricultura. The foundation ot 
oriental agriculture, irrigation and drainage feciliti•• were caratructed 
by them in cooperation with the government. The letter i• the aecond 
aourca ot the fixed capital inve•tment in agriculture. Now after the 
program, landlord•' return• from the land have been cut end fixed. Their 
inter••t in land improvement hee be•n wiped out. The government, too, 
unlike it• pradeceeeor , the Japeneae governmant. hae been aufferlng from 
fin•ncial difficulti••· 
Offaettin9 the withdrallt81 of fixed capital supply from agriculture 
by landlord• end • dacrea•• of the government'• participation in thia 
field 1• the tenant•' etrongar incentive to !~prove the farm•, generated 
by (•) en eKtended planning horiton .. ~e poaaible by secure tenure right• 
end the comp•n••t1on proviaion end (b) an incr•••• in income through both 
rent reduction end the price ceiling nature or th• rent . Although the 
available date indicate that tenant• were not yet ready to ••k• the 
fixed capital investment needed, it ia conceivable that in the future 
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they 11ey become eble to do ao. 'hether or when auch e time aaey come must 
e .. lt future development•. In eny event, turther increase• in production, 
or tor thie metter the long tet'll'I aucc••• or the program, depend heavily 
on the increment ot tha tenenta' and/or gov•rnit1onte' fixed capital 1nv .. t -
ment which uat exceed the e110unt previoualy provided by th• landlords 
•nd Jep•n••• government. 
The progrem ie likely to ale• down the pace of economic developaent 
through ita atrect on aevlng• and caoit•l formation. Th• program i• likely 
to deer•••• ••ving• end capital rormation in agriculture due to the income 
rediatribution eccoapliahed by the program. Thi• decli,. of eaving• end 
ceoital for ... tion in agriculture ta quite influential in the developing 
econo•Y• As the Japanese exaaple ehowa well, in the beginning of indu•-
trielizetion and econo~ic growth. it ia the aurplu• or agriculture that 
function• •• fuel or reed. Aoriculturel aurplu• (anvinga) wae •c~un1ulated 
in th• hand• or lendlorde, trerutferred into th• industry to be trene-
for~ed into machines and induetriel geode. Would the tenant• be able to 
e: cumulete enough agricultural aurplue to feed induatr!elization end 
aconot11ic gro.th? Th• •n•••r to thia queetion muet •wait future study . 
Finally, a decline in the level of antreprenaurahip is elao antici-
pated. 
faced with th••• rapercu••ione on resource uee in agriculture, we 
offer the rollosring complementary ~ae•ures to the progreaa 
(•) Checka en the growth of population ere moat rundalnantal . 1th 
the praeant heavy population burden, it 1• i•poaeible ror the economy 
to aava and inveot the ruaount needed for ataedy 1noraeae of national inco ... 
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(b) Technological edvancem•nt can improve the men-lend ratio by 
incr•••ing r•sourc• productivity. In vi•* or the •l~eady high labor 
1nteneive 1"•r1nin9 existing in Tainn, the technical advancement that 
makes cepital intensive 1"erm1ng poeaibl• will be moetly waloome. 
(c) lnduatrinlir11tion muat teka high priority in Teiwen. Th• type 
of 1ndu•try th•t ebeorb• more laborers yat requires laaa capital 1• pre-
ferred . 
(d) Ona of the raaeone Ditiy capital input• leg recently ia found in 
the unfavorable price ratioe. Industrial goods have bean relatively ax-
paneive c0111parad to the agricultural products. Correction or th••• un-
favorable price ratios can certainly inject iroantive to inveat a110ng 
farlllara. 
(•) The credit improvement ia another maeaure. Hera the ampheei• 
aho~ld be on government regulation end particip•tion. rrom the collec-
tion ot tunde to be loaned out, to the ttrrma of end eupervieion of loans. 
the government should be the major reeponeible ogent. 
(f) Direct 9overnment inveetmenta on a large acele are urgently needed. 
The&• project• mey be of a type thet contribute to egriculture directly, 
auch •• the conatruction of dame. Alt•rnativaly, they may be the kind 
of aocial invaataent contributin; to the economic activity end welfare 
or the rural people. 
(g) (ducation and extension aervioe•, otten unduly neglected, era 
ether beaic 1n11asuree laedinQ to economic development. modern farming ia 
a compliceted prof .. a!on. In order to let termer• undaretend, •• wall ea 
teke edventege or, the up-to-data farming technique• end market information, 
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the education and ext•naion eervic•• ahould b• pushed as vigoroualy ea 
poaaible to reach every corner or the eociety. (qually iaaportant i• 
the voc•tionel training in off-farm Jobe in the rural ereea to rel•••• 
part of th• axe••• agricultural lebor from farms. 
(h) finally, effort• to incraaaa the lend supply and the i•prov .. ent 
or land utilization are el•o helpful. In en old country like Tei••n 
further supply of lard may be r•thar limited but the improveinant of lel"d 
utilization aeema to be llntitl•••· For inatenca, technological progr .. • 
will leeaen the burden put on lend and so will the lend conaolidetion 
program. So will the education and extension earvicea. By the aeme 
token the cuatom of unlimited aucceaaion mu•t be modified. 
All these maaaures ere complementary to the progrern. ~oreover, their 
i111111adiate adoption 1• atrongly auggaeted becau•• they cen attack the 
wpov•rty and inefficiency~ at ite deepest root•. 
Admittedly this atu~y i• not without limitetione. Only the more 
important eepecta or the eubject inettar h•v• b•sn taken up for diecueeion. 
rurthar study , expended to other aepeota, le ,,.•dad in order to overcome 
the•• liaitatione imposed on the preaant •tudy and to obtain a 1110re coa-
prehenaive underatanding of the aubjact ~attar. 
(a) Extaneion of the acope of thi• atudy tolllllrd the ••cond atage of 
the lend refona i• nac••••ry in evaluating the reform. The subject matter 
of thia etudy ie ~•rely the f iret part of the lend reform. Study of the 
aacond atege, the "land-to~tha-till•r" program, is needed to obtain ttw 
co•plete picture of the recent land reform in TeiW11n. 
(b) within !ta own acope, this atudy i• handicapped by the limited 
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data. ~e know very littl• about tha changae in far• organizat.ion and 
raaourc• productivity in tenant•' farming which took place in the poat-
reform deya. rurther study muat be extended to the tanenta' behavior in 
the face or 1ncreeaed income and th• graatar freedom and reaponeibility 
in fer~ing, euch aa cha"9e• in their attitude• towerd work end laiaure, 
toward conewnption end aevin9, toirerd outlet• or eavinga, .. pacielly 
to•erd working end fixed capital inveatmente in eqriculture. The atudy 
or merkata and .. rkating. including international treda, ia the other 
field .. h•va not touched. In order to allow e tenent to get the llM>8t 
out or hi• farming, the poeeibility or development or agricultur•l market• 
end .. rkating in the face or incraea1ng product• urgently cell tor our 
attention. rtnelly, but no l••• important is the population atudy. 
(•pacielly felt ie the need tor the comperetiva atudy of the nature of 
populetion growth ln rural and urban arsea. 
(c) Social eapect• of the program heva been diacua•ad too briefly. 
The drnetic atructlJJ'el change brought about by the progr8Cll Muat have 
changed eociel ch•racteriatlc• or rural Teiwen profoundly. The wey 
people act, ct0tivetione behind tho•• social activitia•, all aapeota of 
the eocial life ~uet be c~ngad. And thie eocial chenge, in turn, muet 
exerci•• some affeote on the economic life or the farmer•. The intensive 
atudy or the program from the eociolo91at•a point of vie• i• thua warmly 
invited. 
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IX. APPENDIXt THE tAR~ A(NT REDUCTION TO 37.5 ~CT 
(Promulgated on June 7, 1951) 
Article l 
The leaaing or farmland •hell be reQUir•d to comply •1th the pro-
viaiona of thia ~ct. Thoae matter• shich •re not provided in thia Act 
•h•ll be gov•rnad by the Lend Lew and the Civil Cod•. 
Article 2 
The rara rental rate shall not excaad 37.5~ or the total annual 
mein crop herveat. If the rental exceed• that rate, it should be r•-
duced to 37.5~ . If the rate i• below 37.5~ , it •hall not be raised. 
The "••in crop~ •• referred to in the preceding section denote• 
euch crop which i• moatly planted according ta the local terming pr•c-
tic• or auch rotation crop• ectually planted and the "main crop harveat" 
denote• the main herveat of auch crop for the purpose of which it i• 
planted. 
Article 3 
A Farm Tenancy Committee shall be aetabliahed in eech Helen, City, 
Village, H•ienq end ~reapectively. Th• m.,.berahip of the tenant 
farmer• in the Committ•• ahell not be l••• than the totel me111berahlp 
or th• landowner• •nd owner farmera. The orgeniz•tionel rule• of th• 
Co111t1ittaa ahall be fixed by th• r rovinci•l Government end approved by 
the Executive Yuan. 
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Article 4 
The at.enderd volume of the total annual main crop herveat on the 
fer~ ehell be decided by the Hsiang. Village end ~Committee according 
to the lend grade end eoprovad by the Heian and City Committee and re-
ported to the Provincial Covarncnant tar contirmetion. 
Article 5 
The tenure of farm leeae shall not be l••• than aix yeera . If the 
e;read tenure atipulated in the original laeae i• longer than ei~ yeera, 
it shell ramein valid. 
Article 6 
After the enforcement of thi• Act, ell farm leaeea shell be med• in 
written form . The leaaor end the le•••• shell be required to ep~ly to 
the Covarnment tor ragieterino any concluaion. alterat ion, expiration or 
revision of farm lease. 
Tha procedure of regiatretion ea referred to in the preceding 
section will be fixed by the Provincial Government end eppravad by the 
Executive Yuan. 
Article 7. 
The •mount. kinda, quality end etendard or f&rM r•nt, data end 
plects of paytnant and other relevant matteu shall be epecif'1celly stipu-
lated in the leeee contract. If the rent ia to be paid in kind end to 
ba tren•ported for peymant by the le••••· the trensportetion coat shall 
be calculated according to the distance end be borne by the leeeor . 
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Article 8 
The le•••• ehould duly p•y the rent to the leaaor . ~h•n the leaeor 
accepts tha rent in klnd, ha shall receive only such quantity aa allowed 
by the senctionad inetrumenta of meeeuramant end ~eight . 
Article 9 
If the other crop ie planted during the growing aaaaon in piece of 
the main crops egraed in the contrect, the leeeea shell still be required 
to pay to the leaeor the rant in terms of such mein crop• ea etipulat.d 
in the leaee contract . But if t.ha leeaor agrees, rent in ceeh or in kind 
of other crop• planted may be paid ae substitute according to the local 
market price et that time. 
Article 10 
If the leaaor refu•e• to accept the rent paid according to the pro-
viwion• of thie Act end the term• of the laaee contract without leg1t1118te 
reeeon. the la•••• may, with the cert1f1cata or tha v1llege end neighbor-
hood chiefs end the farmers' aeeoc1at1on. pay the rent to tha heieng, ,E!:!!.!! 
or ~ government on behalf of the leesor. The governinant ah•ll notify 
th• l•••or to come end tnke tha rent within ten deya . If the leaeor does 
not come within ten daya, the ••ld government may aell the rent in kind 
according to the local market price at that time and keep tNI eale proceed• 
for the laaeor •• it dee~• necessary. The validity of thi• procedure is 
the ae~e ea pay•ent in kind. 
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Article 11 
In ereae diera ~arveet lo.. 1• cau••d by natural cetaetroohee or 
other irr••i•tibl• dieeatara, the l••••• may raQueet lhe local h•i•ng, 
E!:!.!.o, or chy farm Tenancy Cominittee to irnieatigete the percent•~• of 
harvest loaa end to decide the percentage or rent reduction. The hs!eng, 
£!!!!?, or £!!!, rerm Tenancy COlllmllttee shall be required to take up the caae 
~ith1n 3 days. If en extenaiva harvaat lo•• tekas plece in the eraa, the 
haiang, .sh!!l or ~ rerm Tenancy Committee shell immadietaly in\featigate 
and decide the oercentage or harveet loaa end report to tha H•i!n or 
Municipal rar• Tenancy Connittee to decide on the reduction of rent. 
If the crop herveetad i• lase then 30% of the total he.rveat, rent 
shell be exempted. 
Article 12 
The far~ house provided by the leaeor end uaed free of cherga by the 
l•saea shall continue to be uaed by th• leeee• aft•r the enforcement of 
thie Act . The leaaor shall not reruee the continuous uee by the lease• 
undar any excuse or collaot •ny rant for the uee or such houae. 
Article 13 
The laeeae mey freely mel<a eny spacial improvam•nt.e on the farm but 
he should notify in written form the 1 .. aar of the itenie and coat of such 
improvement•. ~hen the leeae expires and the land ie return•d, the leaaor 
ahould give compenaetions to the leaeee for auch itnprovemente, but only 
tor thoea pert• of the improvement.a which are still uaaful et the ti~• 
of 1111Sk1ng the compensation. 
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The epeci•l improvement• an the lend •• raterr•d to in th• preceding 
•action denote auch effort• which, b••id•• k•eping the orioinal quality 
end utility of th• farm unimpaired. heve increeaed the productivity or 
fermlng capacity •• a ~••ult of the increeaed inveetment of lebor end 
cepital. 
Article 14 
Th• l•••or ehall not collect f•rm rent in advance or collect any 
deposit 11anay. The depoeit 1110ney which waa collacted before the enforce-
ment of thi• ~ct shell ba oaid back to the l••••e in inetall•ent• or to 
b• deducted by in•tellmenta from the rent to be paid by the l•••••· 
If the depoeit ~oney ea referred to in the preceding section 1• in 
caah, the amount to ba redalllled should be calculated in term• of farm 
crop in kind by ttw Heien or ~unicipal ra.ria T nancy Coaaittea according 
to the locel market price at the ti~• tllhen it wee collected. 
Article 15 
~hen the tar~ i• to be •old or mortgaged, the l .. ••• ahell heve the 
firat priority to accept the .. 1e or the mortgega. The leeeor should 
inform the le•••• or the tarnut of euch eala or mortgage. tr no written 
reply i• inede by the lee••• within 15 daye, the le•••• shall be conaider ad 
•• oivi"g up hie right of priority of acceoting the eele or the inortg•Q•• 
Ir rerm i• put on re-aele or re-mortgage at a lower price beceuee no 
pul"1:heaar or mortgagee wae round et the orevioue eele or fftOr tgege, the 
leeeae shell have the ••me priority right of accepting the purcheaa or 
1PC>rtgage ea prescribed in the preceding eection. 
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If the lessor aell• or mortgagee the term to the third perty in 
violation of th• provision• in tha t~o preceding aectiona, such eele 
or mortgage •h•ll be declar ed ea invalid egalnat the lest••· 
Article 16 
The lessee should till the land himself end ehould not sub-rant th• 
whole or e pert of th• land to the other persons. 
In ceae the lessee violet•• the proviaion ot the preceding section, 
the laaee contract will be declered null end void and the leaaor may 
•ithdrew the lend end till it hi•••lf or re-rent to the other tenants. 
lllhen auch cesee occurred before the enforcement of thi• Act, the actual 
culti vetion or that part or the land which h•e been eubleeeed end the 
original le•••• cultivating the other part lllhich hee not aubleeaed 
ahell, individually end aeperately, •ign new 188se contract• with the 
original i .. eor, •nd th••• ne• contract• shell expire on the data when 
the original contract expires. 
~'hen the le•••• entruat e the .nole or a pert or the leased lend to 
other p•r•on for cultivation beceue• or l••• re.r~ labor ha po••••••• •• 
e reault or military aervice, auch act of entrust ahall not be de .. ad •• 
•n act ot aub-ranting . 
Artie.la 17 
rerm le••• shell not be tarminetad before th• expiration of th• 
leaae unles• under one of the follo•ino conditionea 
e . hen the leeeee di•• •ithout hair . 
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b. •n the lease& giv•• up the right or l&e•a b•c•u•• or change or 
hie proraaeion or moving cf his raai denca. 
c. ~~•n the leseee fail• to pay the rnrm rant in orraer ot two 
yaera• emount. 
Article 18 
The termination or rerm lea•• ehould be mada erter th• currant h•r-
vaeting eeaeon 1• over end before the next planting ••••on beglna. Ir 
epaoial farming practice or the locality provide• otherwiaa, the termina-
tion mDy be made according to the practice. 
Article 19 
Th• laeaor shall not be •lla .. d to toke beck the leeaad l end for 
.. 1r-cultivation et the time or the expiration of 1111S•• !When one of th• 
following conditiona occure. 
•· hen the i .. aor hea no ability to till the lend hi•aelf. 
b. ~~en the le•sor'• income is sufficient to eupport hie flNlily. 
c. ~twn the le•aee end hie fllltily would loee their meen• of living 
ea a result of loeing the lend. 
If the laaeor's inco-• cen not eupport hia family end et the aerae 
tima the le•••• will lo•• hi• mean• at livirt;a ea a reeult of losing the 
lend ea provided in It8!11 o under the preceding aection , th• laaeor mey 
raquaet the village. ~ or El:!!! rer~ Tenancy Corixi.ittee to mediate the 
c•••· 
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Article 20 
The laaear shall ba raQuired to extend the laeae at the time of the 
leeee •xpiret1on if the leeaae wlahee to continua to till thalartd unlaas 
the laaaor's ect or leaaa termination ia in full complienca with the pro-
viaion of thi• Act. 
Article 21 
Tti. leaaor llho forces the leas•• to give uµ the lend by mean• or 
dureae end violence shall be punished by imprisonment for • tar~ of not 
more than three yaera. 
Article 22 
The laaaor shall be puniehitd by detainment or iapriaonmant for a ter• 
or not .ior• than one year under ona or the following conditions: 
e. Terminating leaae in violation of ~rticle 17 of thie Act. 
b. Teking back land for eelf-cultivation in violation of Article 19 
of thia Actw 
c . Reruaif'\Q to extend the laeea in violation of 1rtiele 20 of thie . 
Act . 
Article 23 
Th• leesor ah•ll be punished by detainment or a fine of not more then 
200 'doller• under one of the following condition•1 
a . Collecting rent in excess or 37.5% r•t• in violation of Article 
2 of thi• Act . 
b. Collecting rent in advance or collecting depoait MDney in 
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violation or Article 14 of th1• Act. 
Article 2• 
Th• le•••• ehell ba punished by dstainmant or e fins of not more 
then 200 dollars if he violates Section I or Article 16 of this Act by 
aub-l•••ing the lend to other P•r•ona. 
Article 25 
In caae the laasor tranerera or 1110rtge98'8 lh• land osn•rahip to th• 
third person before tha le••• expire•, the original le~s• contrect shell 
raaain still valid to the tranefer•• or mortgagee. Th-a transferee or 
mortg•Q•• ahall, lllith the original l••••• · jointly epply for regiatration 
of the leeee alteration. 
Articl• 26 
tr rant diaputa ariaea b•t .. an the leaaor end laaaee, it ahauld b• 
mediated by the local haieng, .£h!!:l. or £!!!:!. Ferm Tenancy Co mitt••• If the 
mediation fall•, it should b• reaiad1eted by thtt Halen or Municipal Farin 
Tenancy Co ittae. If the re-mediation fail•, the Halen or ~unicipal 
Committee 8hould trensfer the diepute to the locel court tor settlement. 
The court ahould immediately try tha c••• without collecting eny procedural 
fee from the disputing p8rti•• · The disputing partiee shell not appeal 
to the court before committee ~•di•tion 1• tried. A written certificate 
1hell be ieaued ta those diaputea which •re eettled by the committee 
edieUon. 
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Article 27 
All proviaione of thie Act shall be applicable to the case of right 
of pezpetuel tenure. 
Article 28 
After the enforc81l19nt of thi• Act, the Provincial Government shell 
fix protective meeauraa for the form-laborer• according to the local 
condition•. The ••89ura shell be epproved by the Executive Yuan. 
Article 29 
The application area of thi• Act •hell be dacided by the order of 
the Executive Yuan. 
A~ticle 30 
Thia Act ahell become afr.ctive on the day or ite proJAUlgation. 
